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INTRODUCTION
1. Proposal by the Governments  of  the Benelux
countries to the Commission  of  the European
Communities
On 8 September 1967 the Permanent Representative
of Belgium extended to the Commission, in the name
of his own Government and those of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, an invitation to collaborate with the
experts of the Member States, on the basis of the draft
Benelux convention, in the unification of private
international law and codification of the rules of
conflict of laws within the Community.
The object of this proposal was to eliminate the
inconveniences arising from the diversity of the rules
of conflict, notably in the field of contract law.
Added to this was 'an element of urgency , having
regard to the reforms likely to be introduced in some
Member States and the consequent 'danger that the
existing divergences would become more marked'
In the words of Mr T. Vogelaar, Director-General for
the Internal Market and Approximation of
Legislation at the Commission, in his opening
address as chairman of the meeting of government
experts on 26 to 28 February 1969: 'This proposal
should bring about a complete unification of the
rules of conflict. Thus in each of our six countries,
instead of the existing rules of conflict and apart
from cases of application of international
Agreements binding any Member State, identical
rules of conflict would enter into force both in
Member States' relations  inter se  and in relations
with non-Community States. Such a development
would give rise to a common corpus of unified legal
rules covering the territory of the Community
Member States. The great advantage of this proposal
is undoubtedly that the level of legal certainty would
be raised, confidence in the stability of legal
relationships fortified, agreements on jurisdiction
according to the applicable law facilitated, and the
protection of rights acquired over the whole field of
private law augmented. Compared with the
unification of substantive law, unification of the
rules of conflict of laws is more practicable,
especially in the field of property law, because the
rules of conflict apply solely to legal relations
involving an international element' (l).
2. Examination  of  the proposal by the Commission
and its consequences
In examining the proposal by the Benelux countries
the Commission arrived at the conclusion that at
least in some special fields of private international
law the harmonization of rules of conflict would be
likely to facilitate the workings of the common
market.
Mr Vogelaar s opening address reviews the grounds
on which the Commission s conclusion was founded
and is worth repeating here:
According to both the letter and spirit of the Treaty
establishing the EEC, harmonization is recognized as
fulfilling the function of permitting or facilitating the
creation in the economic field of legal conditions
similar to those governing an internal market. I
appreciate that opinions may differ as to the precise
delimitation of the inequalities which directly affect
the functioning of the common market and those
having only an indirect effect. Yet there are still legal
fields in which the differences between national legal
systems and the lack of unified rules of conflict
definitely impede the free movement of persons,
goods, services and capital among the Member
States.
Some will give preference to the harmonization or
unification of substantive law rather than the
harmonization of rules of conflict. As we know, the
former has already been achieved in various fields.
However, harmonization of substantive law does not
always contrive to keep pace with the dismantling of
economic frontiers. The problem of the law to be
applied will therefore continue to arise as long as
substantive law is not unified. The number of cases in
which the question of applicable law must be
resolved increases with the growth of private law
relationships across frontiers.
At the same time there will be a growing number of
cases in which the courts have to apply a foreign law.
The Convention signed on 27 September 1968 on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and c9mmercial matters uniformly governs the
international jurisdiction of the courts within the31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/5
Community. It should help to facilitate and expedite
many civil actions and enforcement proceedings. It
also enables the parties. in many matters, to teach
agreements assigning jurisdiction and to choose
among several courts. The outcome may be that
preference is given to the court of a State whose law
seems to offer a better solution to the proceedings. To
prevent this "forum shopping increase legal
certainty, and anticipate more easily the law which
will be applied, it would be advisable for the rules of
conflict to be unified in fields of particular economic
importance so that the same law is applied
irrespective of the State in which the decision is
gIven.
To sum up, there are three main considerations
guiding our proposal for harmonizing the rules of
conflict for a few well-defined types of legal
relations. The first is dictated by the history of private
international law: to try to unify everything is to
attempt too much and would take too long. The
second is the urgent necessity for greater legal
certainty in some sectors of major economic
importance. the third is the wish to forestall any
aggravation of the differences between the rules of
private international law of the various Member
States' (2).
These were in fact the motives which prompted the
Commission to convene a meeting of experts from
the Member States in order to obtain a complete
picture of the present state of the law and to decide
whether and to what extent a harmonization or
unification of private international law within the
Community should be undertaken. The invitation
was accompanied by a questionnaire designed to
facilitate the discussion (3).
3. Favourable attitude  of  Member States to the
search for uniform rules of conflict, the setting 
priorities and establishment  of  the working group to
study and work out these rules
The meeting in question took place on 26 to 28
February 1969. It produced a first survey of the
situation with regard to prospects for and possible
advantage of work in the field of unification of rules
of conflict among Member States of the European
Communities (4).
However, it was not until the next meeting on 20 to 22
October 1969 that the government experts were able
to give a precise opinion both on the advisability and
scope of harmonization and on the working
procedure and organization of work.
As regards advisability of harmonization the
Member States' delegations (with the sole exception
of the German delegation) declared themselves to be
fundamentally in agreement on the value of the work
in making the law more certain in the Community.
The German delegation, while mentioning some
hesitation on this point in professional and business
circles, said that this difference of opinion was not
such as to affect the course of the work at the present
time.
As regards the scope of harmonization, it was
recognized (withoUt prejudice to future
developments) that a start should be made on matters
most closely involved in the proper functioning 
the common market, more specifically:
I. the law applicable to corporeal and incorporeal
property;
2. the law applicable to contractual and non-
contractual obligations;
3. the law applicable to the form of legal
transactions and evidence;
4. general matters under the foregoing heads
(renvoi, classification, application of foreign law
acquired rights public policy, capacity,
representation).
As for the legal basis of the work, it was the
unanimous view that the proposed harmonization
without being specifically connected with the
provisions of Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, would
be a natural sequel to the Convention on jurisdiction
and enforcement of judgments.
Lastly, on the procedure to be followed, all the
delegations were in favour of that adopted for work
on the Conventions already signed or in process of
drafting under Article 220 and of seeking the most
suitable ways of expediting the work (5).
The results of the meeting were submitted through the
Directorate-General for the Internal Market an
Approximation of Legislation to the Commission
with a proposal to seek the agreement of Member
States for continuance of the work and preparation
of a preliminary draft Convention establishing
uniformity of law in certain relevant areas of private
international law.
The Commission acceded to the proposal. At its
meeting on 15 January 1970 the Committee of
Permanent Representatives expressly authorized the
Group to continue its work on harmonization of the
rules of private international law, on the
understanding that the preliminary draft or drafts
would give priority to the four areas previously
indicated.No C 282/6 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
Following the abovementioned decision of the
Permanent Representatives Committee. the Group
met on 2 and 3 February 1970 and elected its
chairman, Mr P. Jenard, Director of Administration
in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
External Trade, and its vice-chairman, Prof. Miccio
Counsellor to the Italian Court of Cassation.
Having regard to the decision of the previous
meeting that the matters to be given priority should
be divided into four sectors, the Group adopted the
principle that each of the four sectors should have its
own rapporteur appointed as follows, to speed up the
work:
1. in the case of the law applicable to corporeal and
incorporeal property, by the German
delegation;
2. in the case of the law applicable to contractual
and extracontractual obligations, by the Italian
delegation:
3. in the case of the law applicable to the form of
legal transactions and evidence, by the French
delegation;
4. in general matters, by the Netherlands
delegation, in agreement with the Belgian and
Luxembourg delegations.
As a result the following were appointed: Prof. K.
Arndt, Oberlandsgerichtsprasident a. d. ; Prof. M.
Giuliano, University of Milan; Prof. P. Lagarde,
University of Paris I; Mr T. van Sasse van Ysselt
Director in the Netherlands Ministry of Justice.
Other matters were dealt with at the same meeting,
notably the kind of cenvention to be prepared, as to
which the great majority of delegates favoured a
universal convention not based upon reciprocity; the
method of work; participation of observers from the
Hague Conference on Private International Law and
the Benelux Commission on Unification of
Law (6).
4. Organization, progress and initial results  of  the
Group s work at the end  of  1972
The Group took as its starting point the examination
and discussion of the questionnaires prepared by the
rapporteurs, Messrs Giuliano, Lagarde and van
Sasse van Y sselt in their respective fields. They were
discussed at a meeting of the rapporteurs chaired by
Mr Jenard on I to 4 June 1970. The three
questionnaires were subjected to a thorough analysis,
extending both to the rules of conflict (national or
established by convention) in force in the
Community Member States and to the evolutionary
trends already apparent in case law and legal theory
in certain countries or worthy of consideration in
relation to certain present-day reqirements in
international life. This oral analysis was further
supplemented by the written replies given by each
rapporteur on the basis of the statutes, case law and
legal theory of his own country (of the three Benelux
countries in the case of Mr van Sasse) to the
questionnaires drawn up by his colleagues and
himself  C).
This preliminary work and material enabled each of
the rapporteurs to present an interim report, with
draft articles on the matter considered, as a working
basis for the Group meetings. It was agreed that these
meetings would be devoted to an examination of Mr
Giuliano report on the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations and to
the subject matter of Mr Lagarde s and Mr van Sasse
van Ysselt's report to the extent that this was relevant
to Mr Giuliano s subject.
It was agreed that Mr Arndt's report on the law
applicable to corporeal and incorporeal property
would be discussed later, Mr Arndt having explained
that a comparative study of the principal laws on
security rights and interests should precede his report
and that the need for such a study had been generally
recognized.
Apart from the meeting of rapporteurs in June 1970
the work fully occupied 11 Group plenary sessions
each with an average duration of five days (8).
At its meeting in June 1972 the Group completed the
preliminary draft convention on the law applicable
to contractual and non-contractual obligations and
decided that it should be submitted, together with the
reports finalized at a meeting of rapporteurs on 27
and 28 September 1972 to the Permanent
Representatives Commitee for transmission to the
Governments of the Community Member States (9).
5. Re-examination  of  Group work in the light of
obsenations by the Governments  of  original aDd new
Member States  of  the EEC and results achieved in 
February 1979
It follows from the foregoing observations that the
1972 draft dealt both with the law applicable to
contractual obligations and with that applicable to
non-contractual obligations. At the same time it
provided solutions relating to the law governing the
form of legal transactions and evidence, questions of
interpretation of uniform rules and their relationship31. 10. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/7
with other rules of conflict of international origin, to
the extent to which these were connected with the
subject of the preliminary draft.
Following the accession of the United Kingdom
Denmark and Ireland to the EEC in 1973 the
Commission extended the Group to include
government experts from the new Member States and the Permanent Representatives Commitee
authorized the enlarged Group to re-examine in the
light of observations from the Governments of the
original and of the new Member States of the EEC,
the preliminary draft convention which the
Commission had submitted to it at the end of 1972.
The Group elected Prof. Philip as vice-chairman.
Nevertheless the preliminary draft was not re-
examined immediately. The need to allow the experts
from the new Member States time to consult their
respective Governments and interested parties on the
one hand and the political uncertainties in the United
Kingdom concerning membership of the European
Communities (which were not settled until the 1975
referendum) on the other, resulted in a significant
reduction (if not suspension) of the Group s activities
for about three years. It was not until the end of 1975
that the Group was able properly to resume its work
and proceed with the preparation of the Convention
on the law applicable to contractual obligations. In
fact the Group decided at its meeting in March 1978
to limit the present convention to contracts alone and
to begin negotiations for a second Convention, on
non-contractual obligations, after the first had been
worked out. Most delegations thought it better for
reasons of time to finish the part relating to
contractual obligations first.
The original preliminary draft, with the limitation
referred to, was re-examined in the course of 14
plenary sessions of the Group and three special
meetings on transport and insurance contracts; each
oftbe plenary sessions lasted two to five days (10). At
the meeting in February 1979 the Group finished the
draft convention, decided upon the procedure for
transmitting the draft to the Council before the end
of April and instructed Professors Giuliano and
Lagarde to draw up the report; this was then finalized
at a meeting of rapporteurs on 18 to 20 June 1979 in
which one expert per delegation participated, and
transmitted in turn to the Council and to the
Governments by the chairman, Mr Jenard.
6. Finalization  of  the Convention within the Council
of  the European Communitees
On 18 May 1979 the Group s chairman, Mr Jenard,
sent the draft Convention to the President of the
Council ofthe European Communities with a request
that the Governments make their comments on the
draft by the end of the year so that the Convention
could then be concluded during 1980.
On 20 July 1979 Mr Jenard sent the President of the
Council a draft report on the Convention, which was
the predecessor of this report.
The General Secretariat of the Council received
written comments from the Belgian, Netherlands,
Danish, Irish, German, Luxembourg ahd United
Kingdom Governments. In addition, on 17 March
1980, the Commission adopted an opinion on the
draft Convention, which was published in  Oflicial
Journal of the European Communities  No L 94 of 
April 1980.
On 16 January 1980 the Permanent Representatives
Commitee set up an  ad hoc  working party on private
international law whose terms of reference were
twofold:
to finalize the Convention text in the light of the
comments made by Member States
Governments,
to consider whether, and if so within what limits,
the Court of Justice of the European
Communities should be given jurisdiction to
interpret the Convention.
The  ad hoc  working party met twice, from 24 to 28
March and 21 to 25 April 1980, with Mr Brancaccio
from the Italian Ministry of Justice in the chair (II).
Working from the Governments' written comments
and others made orally during discussions, the
working party reached general agreement on the
substantive provisions of the Convention and on the
accompanying report.
The only problems unresolved by the working party
concerned the problem of where the Convention
stood in relation to the Community legal order. They
arose in particular in determining the number of
ratifications required for the Convention to come
into force and in drafting a statement by the
Governments of the Member States on the conferral
of jurisdiction on the Court of Justice.
Following a number of discussions in the Permanent
Representatives Committee, which gradually
brought agreement within sight the Council
Presidency deemed circumstances to be ripe
politkally for the points of disagreement to be
discussed by the Ministers of Justice with a good
chance of success at a special Council meeting on 
June 1980 in Rome.No C 282/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
At that meeting, a final round of negotiations
produced agreement on a number of seven Member
States required to ratify in order for the Convention
to come into force. Agreement was also reached on
the wording of a joint statement on the interpretation
of the Convention by the Court of Justice, which
followed word for word the matching statement
made by the Governments of the original six Member
States of the Community. when .the Convention on
jurisdiction and enforcement was concluded on 27
September 1968 in Brussels. In adopting the
statement, the Representatives of Governments of
the Member States, meeting within the Council, also
instructed the  ad hoc  Council working party on
private international law to consider by what means
point 1 of the statement could be implemented and
report back by 30 June 1981.
With these points settled, the President-in-Office of
the Council, Tommaso Morlino, Italian Minister of
Justice recorded the agreement of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States meeting within the Council, on the
following:
adoption of the text of the Convention and of the
two joint statements annexed to it
the Convention would be open for signing from
19 June 1980
the Convention and accompanying report would
be published in the  Official Journal. of the
European Communities  for information.
The Convention was signed on 19 June 1980 by the
plenipotentiaries of Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands.
7. Review of the intemal sources and nature  of  the
rules in force in the EEC Member States relating to the
law applicable to contractual obligations
The chief aim of the Convention is to introduce into
the national laws of the EEC Member States a set of
uniform rules on the law applicable to contractual
obligations and on certain general points of private
international law to the extent that these are linked
with those obligations.
Without going here into details of positive law
though it may be necessary to return to it in the
comments on the uniform rules, a short survey can
now be given of the internal sources and the nature of
the rules of conflict at present in force in the
Community countries in the field covered by the
Convention. This survey will bring out both the value
and the difficulties of the unification undertaken by
the Group and of which the convention is only the
first fruit.
Of the nine Member States of the Community, Italy
is the only one to have a set of rules of conflict
enacted by the legislature covering almost all the
matters with which the Convention is concerned.
These rules are to be found for the most part in the
second paragraph of Article 17 and in Articles 25, 26,
. 30 and 31 of the general provisions constituting the
introduction to the 1942 Civil Code, and in Articles 9
and 10 of the 1942 Navigation Code.
In the other Member States of the Community,
however, the body of rules of conflict on the law
applicable to contractual obligations is founded only
'On customary rules or on rules originating in case
law. Academic studies and writings have helped
considerably to develop and harmonize these rules.
The position as just stated has not been altered
substantially either by the French draft law
supplementing the Civil Code in respect of private
international law (1967) or by the Benelux Treaty
establishing uniform rules of private international
law signed in Brussels on 3 July 1969. These two texts
are certainly an interesting attempt to codify the rules
of conflict and also, in the case of the Benelux
countries, to make these rules uniform on an inter-
State level. The Group did not fail to take account of
their results in its own work. However, the entry into
force of the Benelux Treaty has not been pursued
and the French draft law seems unlikely to be
adopted in the near future.
8. Universal application  of  the uniform rules
From the very beginning of its work the Group has
professed itselfto be in favour of uniform rules which
would apply not only to the nationals of Member
States and to persons domiciled or resident within
the Community but also to the nationals of third
States and to persons domiciled or resident therein.
The provisions of Article 2 specify the universal
application of the convention.
The Group took the view that its main purpose was to
frame general rules such as those existing in
legislative provisions currently in force in Italy and
in the Benelux Treaty and the French draft law. 
such a context these general rules, which would
become the 'common law' of each Member State for
settling conflicts of laws, would not prejudice the
detailed regulation of clearly delimited matters31. 10. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/9
arising from other work, especially that of the Hague
Conference on private international law. The
application of these particular conventions 
safeguarded by the provisions of Article 21.
9. On the normally general nature  of  the uniform
. rules in the Convention  alld  their siinificance in the
unification of  laws already undertaken in the field 
private intemationallaw
At the outset of its work the Group had also to
determine the nature and scope of the uniform rules
of conflict to be formulated. Should they be general
rules, to be applied indiscriminately to all contracts,
or would it be better to regulate contractual
obligations by means of a series of specific rules
applicable to the various categories of contract, or
again should an intermediate solution be envisaged
namely by adopting general rules and supplementing
them by specific rules for certain categories of
contract ?
Initially the rapporteur advocated the latter method.
This provided that, in default of an express of
implied choice by the parties, the contract would be
governed (subject to specific provisions for certain
categories) by one system of law.
When the Group tackled the question of whether to
supplement the general rules for determining the law
applicable to the contract by some specific rules for
certain categories of contract it became clear that the
point was no longer as significant as it had been in
the context of the rapporteur s initial proposals. The
Group s final version of the text of Article 4 provided
satisfactory solutions for most of the contracts whose
applicable law was the subject of specific rules of
conflict in the rapporteur proposals, notably
because of its flexibility. The Group therefore merely
provided for some exceptions to the rule contained in
Article 4, notably those in Articles 5 and 6
concerning the law applicable respectively to certain
consumer contracts and to contracts of employment
in default of an express or implied choice by the
parties.
The normally general nature of the uniform rules
made it necessary to provide for a few exceptions and
to allow the judge a certain discretion as to their
application in each particular case. This aspect will
be dealt with in the comments on a number of
Articles in Chapter III of this report.
As declared in the Preamble, in concluding this
Convention the nine States which are parties to the
Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community show their desire to continue in the field
of private international law the work of unification
already undertaken in the Community, particularly
in matters of jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments. The question of accession by third States
is not dealt with in the Convention (see page 41
penultimate paragraph).No C 282/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
TITLE I
Article 
Scope of the Convention
1. As provided in Article 1 (1) the uniform rules in
this Convention apply generally to contractual
obligations in situations involving a conflict of
laws.
It must be stressed that the uniform rules apply to the
abovementioned obligations only 'in situations
involving a choice between the laws of different
countries . The purpose of this provision is to define
the true aims of the uniform rules. We know that the
law applicable to contracts and to the obligations
arising from them is not always that of the country
where the problems of interpretation or enforcement
are in issue. There are situations in which this law is
not regarded by the legislature or by the case law as
that best suited to govern the contract and the
obligations resulting from it. These are situations
which involve one or more elements foreign to the
internal social system of a country (for example, the
fact that one or all of the parties to the contract are
foreign nationals or persons habitually resident
abroad, the fact that the contract was made abroad
the fact that one or more of the obligations of the
parties are to be performed in a foreign country, etc.
thereby giving the legal systems of several countries
claims to apply. These are precisely the situations in
which the uniform rules are intended to apply.
Moreover the present wording of paragraph 1 means
that the uniform rules are to apply in all cases where
the dispute would give rise to a conflict between two
or more legal systems. The uniform rules also apply 
those systems coexist within one State (cf. Article
19 (1)). Therefore the question whether a contract is
governed by English or Scots law is within the scope
of the Convention, subject to Article 19 (2).
2. The principle embodied in paragraph 
however subject to a number of restrictions.
First, since the Convention is concerned only with
the law applicable to contractual obligations
property rights and intellectual property are not
covered by these provisions. An Article in the
original preliminary draft had expressly so provided.
However, the Group considered that such a
provision would be superfluous in the present text,
especially as this would have involved the need to
recapitulate the differences existing as between the
various legal system of the Member States of the
Community.
3. There are also the restrictions set out 
paragraph 2 of Article 
The first of these, at (a), is the status or legal capacity
of natural persons, subject to Article 11; then, at (b),
contractual obligations relating to wills and
succession, to property rights arising out of
matrimonial relationships, to rights and duties
arising out of family relationships parentage,
marriage or affinity, including maintenance
obligations in respect of illegitimate children. The
Group intended this enumeration to exclude from
the scope of the Convention all matters of family
law.
As regards maintenance obligations, within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Hague Convention on the
law applicable to maintenance obligations, the
Group considered that this exclusion should also
extend to contracts which parties unter a legal
maintenance obligation make in performance of that
obligation. All other contractual obligations, even if
they provide for the maintenance of a member of the
family towards whom there are no legal maintenance
obligations, would fall within the scope of the
Convention.
Contrary to the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 1 in the original preliminary draft, the
current wording of subparagraph (b) does not in
general exclude gifts. Most of the delegations
favoured the inclusion of gifts where they arise from
a contract within the scope of the Convention, even
when made within the family, provided they are not
covered by family law. Therefore the only
contractual gifts left outside the scope of the uniform31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/11
rules are those to which family law, the law relating
to matrimonial property rights or the law of
succession apply.
The Group unanimously affirmed that matters
relating to the custody of children are outside the
scope of the Convention, since they fall within the
sphere of personal status and capacity. However, the
Group thought it inappropriate to specify this
exclusion in the text of the Convention itself, thereby
intending to avoid an  a contrario  interpretation of
the Convention of 27 September 1968.
To obviate any possibility of misconstruction, the
present wording of subparagraphs (a) and (b) uses
the same terminology as the 1968 Convention 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments.
4. Subparagraph (c) excludes from the scope of the
uniform rules in the first instance obligations arising
from bills of exchange, cheques, promissary notes.
In retaining this exclusion, for which provision had
already been made in the original preliminary draft,
the Group took the view that the provisions of the
Convention were not suited to the regulation of
obligations of this kind. Their inclusion would have
involved rather complicated special rules. Moreover
the Geneva Conventions to which several Member
States of the Community are parties govern most of
these areas. Also, certain Member States of the
Community regard these obligations as non-
contractual.
Subparagraph (c) also excludes other negotiable
instruments to the extent that the obligations under
such other negotiable instruments arise out of their
negotiable character. If a document, though the
obligation under it is transferable, is not regarded as
a negotiable instrument, it falls outside the exclusion.
This has the effect that such documents as bills of
lading, similar documents issued in connection with
transport contracts, and bonds debentures,
guarantees letters of indemnity, certificates of
deposit, warrants and warehouse receipts are only
excluded by subparagraph (c) if, they can be
regarded as negotiable instruments; and even then
the exclusion only applies with regard to obligations
arising out of their negotiable character.
Furthermore, neither the contracts pursuant to which
such instruments are issued nor contracts for the
purchase and sale of such instruments are excluded.
Whether a document is characterized as a negotiable
instrument is not governed by this Convention and is
a matter for the law of the forum (including its rules
of private international law).
5. Arbitration agreements and agreements on the
choice of court are likewise excluded from the scope
of the Convention (subparagraph (d)).
There was a lively debate in the Group on whether or
not to exclude agreements on the choice of court. The
majority in the end favoured exclusion for the
following reasons: the matter lies within the sphere of
procedure and forms part of the administration 
justice (exercise of State authority); rules on this
matter might have endangered the ratification of the
Convention. It was also noted that rules on
jurisdiction are a matter of public policy and there is
only marginal scope for freedom of contract. Each
court is obliged to determine the validity of the
agreement on the choice of court in relation to its
own law, not in relation to the law chosen. Given the
nature of these provisions and their fundamental
diversity, no rule of conflict can lead to a uniform
solution. Moreover, these rules would in any case be
frustated if the disputes were brought before a court
in a third country. It was also pointed out that so far
as concerns relationships within the Community, the
most important matters (valitidity of the clause and
form) are governed by Article 17 of the Convention
of 27 September 1968. The outstanding points
notably those relating to consent, do not arise in
practice, having regard to the fact that Article 
provides that these agreements shall be in writing.
Those delegations who thought that agreements on
choice of court should be included within the
Convention pointed out that the validity of such an
agreement would often be dealt with by the
application of the same law that governed the rest of
the contract in which the agreement was included
and should therefore be governed by the same law as
the contract. In some systems oflaw, agreement as to
choice of court is itself regarded as a contract and the
ordinary choice of law rules are applied to discover
the law applicable to such a contract.
As regards arbitration agreements certain
delegations, notably the United Kingdom
delegation, had proposed that these should not be
excluded from the Convention. It was emphasized
that an arbitration agreement does not differ from
other agreements as regards the contractual aspects,
and that certain international Conventions do not
regulate the law applicable to arbitration agreements,
while others are inadequate in this respect. Moreover
the international Conventions have not been ratified
by all the Member States of the Community and
even if they had been, the problem would not be
solved because these Conventions are not of
universal applications. It was added that there would
not be unification within the Community on this
important matter in international commerce.
Other delegations, notably the German and French
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emphasizing particularly that any increase in the
number of conventions in this area should 
avoided, that severability is accepted in principle in
the draft and the arbitration clause is independent
that the concept of 'closest ties' difficult to apply to
arbitration agreements, that procedural and
contractual aspects are difficult to separate, that the
matter is complex and the experts' proposals show
great divergences; that since procedural matters and
those relating to the question whether a dispute was
arbitrable would in any case be excluded, the only
matter to be regulated would be consent; that the
International Chamber of Commerce - which, as
everyone knows, has great experience in this matter
has not felt the need for further regulation.
Having regard to the fact that the solutions which can
and have been considered generally for arbitration
are very complex and show great disparity, a delegate
proposed that this matter should be studied
separately and any results embodied in a Protocol.
The Group adopted this proposal and consequently
excluded arbitration agreements from the scope of
the uniform rules, subject to returning to an
examination of these problems and of agreements on
the choice of court once the Convention has been
finally drawn up.
The exclusion of arbitration agreements does not
relate solely to the procedural aspects, but also to the
formation, validity and effects of such agreements.
Where the arbitration clause forms an integral part of
a contract, the exclusion relates only to the clause
itself and not to the contract as a whole. This
exclusion does not prevent such clauses being taken
into consideration for the purposes of Article 3 (I).
6. Subparagraph (e) provides that the uniform rules
shall not apply to questions governed by the law of
companies, and other bodies corporate or
unincorporate such as the creation, by registration or
otherwise, legal capacity, internal organization or
winding-up of companies, and other bodies
corporate or unincorporate and the personal legal
liability of officers and members as such for the
obligations of the company or body.
This exclusion in no way implies that this aspect was
considered unimportant in the economic life of 
Member States of the Community. Indeed, this is an
area which, by virtue of its economic importance and
the place which it occupies in many provisions of the
Treaty establishing the EEC, appears to have the
strongest possible reasons for not being separated
from Community work in the filed of unification of
private international law, notably in conflicts of laws
pertaining to economic relations.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, the
Group had thought it inadvisable, even in the
original preliminary draft, to include companies,
firms and legal persons within the scope of the
Convention, especially in view of the work being
done on this subject within the European
Communities (12).
Confirming this exclusion, the Group stated that it
affects all the complex acts (contractual
administrative, registration) which are necessary to
the creation of a company or firm and to the
regulation of its internal organization and winding-
up, i. e. acts which fall within the scope of company
law.
On the other hand, acts or preliminary contracts
whose sole purpose is to create obligations between
interested parties (promoters) with a view to forming
a company or firm are not covered by the
exclusion.
The subject may be a body with or without legal
personality, profit-making or non-profit-making.
Having regard to the differences which exist, it may
be that certain relationships will be regarded as
within the scope of company law or might be treated
as being governed by that law (for example, societe de droit civil nicht-rechtsfahiger Verein,
partnership, Vennootschap onder firma, etc.) in
some countries but not in others. The rule has been
made flexible in order to take account of the diversity
of national laws.
Examples of 'internal organization' are: the calling
of meetings, the right to vote, the necessary quorum,
the appointment of officers of the company or firm,
etc. 'Winding-up' would cover either the termination
of the company or firm as provided by its
constitution or by operation of law, or its
disappearance by merger or other similar process.
At the request of the German delegation the Group
extended the subparagraph (e) exclusion to the
personal liability of members and organs, and also to
the legal capacity of companies or firms. On the other
hand the Group did not adopt the proposal that
mergers and groupings should also be expressly
mentioned, most of the delegations being of the
opinion that mergers and groupings were already
covered by the present wording.
As regards legal capacity, it should be made clear
that the reference is to limitations, which may be
imposed by law on companies and firms, for example
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to ultra vires  acts by organs of the company or firm,
which fall under subparagraph (t).
7. The solution adopted in subparagraph (t)
involves the exclusion from the scope of the uniform
rules of the question whether an agent is able to bind
a principal, or an organ to bind a company or body
corporate or unincorporate, to a third party.
The exclusion affects only the relationships between
the principial and third parties, more particularly the
question whether the principal is bound  vis-a-vis
third parties by the acts of the agent in specific cases.
It does not affect other aspects of the complex field of
agency, which also extends to relationships between
the principal and the agent and to agent-third party
relationships. The exclusion is justified by the fact
that it is difficult to accept the principle of freedom of
contract on this point. On the other hand, principal-
agent and agent-third party relationships in no way
differ from other obligations and are therefore
included within the scope of the Convention in so far
as they are of a contractual nature.
8. The exception in subparagraph (g) concerns
trusts' in the sense in which they are understood in
the common law countries. The English word 'trust'
is properly used to define the scope of the exclusion.
On the other hand similar institutions under
continental laws falls within the provisions of the
Convention because they are normally contractual in
origin. Nevertheless it will be open to the judge 
treat them in the same way as the institutions of the
common law countries when they exhibit the same
characteristics.
9. Under subparagraph (h) the uniform rules do not
apply to evidence and procedure, subject to
Article 14.
This exclusion seems to require no comment. The
scope and extent to which the exclusion is subject to
limitation will be noted in the commentary on
Article 14.
10. The question whether contracts of insurance
should or should not be included in the sope of the
uniform rules was discussed at length by the Group.
The solution finally adopted was that which appears
in paragraph 3.
Under this paragraph the provisions of the
Convention do not apply  to  contracts of insurance
covering risks situated in the territories  of  Member
States of the European Economic Community. This
exclusion takes account of work being done within
the Community in the field of insurance. Thus the
uniform rules apply  to  contracts of insurance
covering risks situate outside those territories. The
States are nevertheless free to apply rules based on
those in the Convention even to risks situate in the
Community, subject to the Community rules which
are to be estabIL~hed.
Insurance contracts, where they cover risks situate
outside the Community, may also, in appropriate
cases, fall under Article 5 of the Convention.
To determine whether a risk is situate in the
territories of the Member States of the Community
the last phrase of paragraph 3 states that the judge is
required  to  apply his own national law. This
expression means the rules in force in the judge
country, to the exclusion of the rules of private
international law as stated by Article 15 of the
Convention.
11. By virtue of paragraph 4 of Article I the
exclusion provided for in paragraph 3 does not affect
reinsurance contracts. In fact these contracts do not
raise the same problems as contracts of insurance,
where the need to protect the persons insured must
necessarily be taken into account. Thus the uniform
rules apply  to  reinsurance contracts.
Article 
A,plicatioD of  law  of --C08tnu:tiDg States
This Article underlines the universal character of the
uniform rules laid down in this Convention. The
Convention does not apply only in situations
involving some form of connection with one or other
of the Contracting States. It is of universal
application in the sense that the choice of law which
it lays down may result in the law of a State not party
to the Convention being applied. By way of example,
under Article 3, parties to a contract may opt for the
law of a third State, and in !be absence of any choice
that same law may be applied to the contract under
Articles 4 and 5 if it is with that State that the contract
has the closest links. In other words, the Convention
is a uniform measure of private international law
which will replace the rules of private international
law in force in each of the Contracting States, with
regard to the subject matter which it covers and
subject  to  any other convention to which the
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The solution is consistent with that adopted in most
of the Hague Conventions on private international
law that deal with choice of laws  (stricto sensu).  The
text follows that of the Hague Convention drafted
during the XlIIth session (Conventions of 14 March
1978 on the law applicable to matrimonial property
regimes, Article 2, and on the law applicable to
agency, Article 4).31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/15
UNIFORM RULES
TITLE II
Article 
Freedom of choice
1. The rule stated in Article 3 (1) under which the
contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties
simply reaffirms a rule currently embodied in the
private international law of all the Member States of
the Community and of most other countries.
In French law the rule conferring this power (or
autonomie de la volonte'  as it is called) upon the
parties is founded on case law dating back to the
judgment delivered on 5 December 1910 by the Court
of Cassation in  American Trading Company 
Quebec Steamship Company Limited.  The French
draft law of 1967 to supplement the Civil Code in
matters of private international law merely confirms
the state of French law in this matter by providing in
the first paragraph of Article 2312: 'Contracts of an
international character and the obligations arising
from them shall be subject to the law under which the
parties intended to place themselves.
The firm establishment of the rule in French case law
was accompanied by corresponding developments in
legal theory. The most eminent contemporary writers
declare themselves fundamentally in favour of the
principle of the parties' freedom of contract in
determining the law applicable to the contract, or
according to the opinion of some legal writers, the
localization' of the contract in a specific legal
system (13).
The same applies to the law of the German Federal
Republic, where the subject of contractual
obligations was not dealt with by the legislature in the
final version of the 'introductory law' of 1896. The
rule conferring upon the parties the power to specify
the law applicable to their contract is nevertheless
founded on case law which has been developed and
strengthened in recent decades despite the opposition
of the great majority of earlier German legal
theorists. At all events present-day theory is in entire
agreement with the position taken by the case
law (14).
Unlike the situation in France and Germany, in Italy
the principle of freedom of contract of the
contracting parties was expressly enacted as early as
1865 in the preliminary provisions of the Civil Code.
It is currently based upon the first paragraph of
Article 25 of the preliminary provisions of the 1942
Civil Code, in which the freedom of the parties to
choose the law applicable to their contract is formally
accepted, as in Articles 9 and 10 of the Navigation
Code, where it is provided that the power of the
parties to designate the applicable law may also be
exercised in seamen s contracts and in contracts fot
the use of ships, boats and aircraft. According to the
preponderant view of theorists and consistent
decisions by the Court of Cassation, the law
applicable to the contract must be determined
primarily on the basis of the express will of the
parties; only in default of such a nomination will the
law of the contract be determined by the connecting
factors stipulated in the abovementioned
provisions (15).
As regards Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, the rule that the contracting parties
enjoy freedom of contract in choosing the applicable
law has also been sanctioned by judicial practice and
by contemporary legal writers.
In its judgment of 24 February 1938 in  SA Antwerpia
v. Ville d'Anvers  the Belgian Court of Cassation
stated for the first time, in terms clearly suggested by
the French judgment of 5 December 1910, that: 'the
law applicable to contracts, both to their formation
and their conditions and effects, (is) that adopted by
the parties' (16). Several Belgian writers have
contributed to the firm establishment of the rule in
theory and in practice (17).
In the Netherlands the Hoge Raad put the finishing
touches to the developments in case law in this field
in its judgment of 13 May 1966 in the  Alnati  case. The
previous decisions of the Supreme Court and the
differing views of writers on the precise scope of the
freedom of contract rule would not have permitted
definition of the state of Netherlands law in this
matter with sufficient certainty (18).No C 282/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
At all events the 1969 Benelux Treaty on uniform
rules for private international law, even though the
signatory States have not pursued its entry into force,
is clear evidence of their present views on this
subject. Article 13 (1) of the uniform law states:
Contracts shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties as regards both essential and ancillary
provisions
English law recognizes that the parties to a contract
are free to choose the law which is to govern it ('the
proper law of the contract'). This principle of
freedom of choice is founded on judicial
decisions (19). In  Vita Food Products Inc. Y. Unus
Shipping Co. Ltd  (20) Lord Wright indicated that the
parties' choice must be  bona fide  and legal and could
be avoided on the ground of public policy. In certain
areas the parties' freedom of choice  is subject to
limitations imposed by statute (20a), the most
important of these being in the field of exemption
clauses (20b
The law of Scotland is to similar effect (2Oc) and Irish
law draws its inspiration from the same principles as
the English and Scottish legal systems.
Under English law (and the situation is similar in
Scots law and Irish law), in the case where the parties
have not expressly chosen the law to govern their
contract (lOci), the court will consider whether the
parties' choice of law to be applied can be inferred
from the terms of the contract. The most common
case in which the court may infer a choice of the
proper law is where the contract contains an
arbitration or choice of jurisdiction clause naming a
particular country as the seat of arbitration or
litigation. Such a clause gives rise to an argument that
the law of the country chosen should be applied as
the proper law of the contract. This inference
however is not conclusive and can be rebutted by any
contrary inferences which may be drawn from the
other provisions of the contract and the relevant
surrounding circumstances (20e).
Finally, as regards Denmark, the principle of the
freedom of contracting parties to choose the law
applicable to their contract already seems to have
inspired several opinions by Supreme Court judges
during this century. Today at all events this principle
forms the basis of Danish case law, as can be seen
from the judgment in 1957 in  Baltica v. M  1.  Vermaas
Scheepvaart bedrijf,  with full support from legal
writers (21).
2. The principle of the parties' freedom to choose
the law applicable is also supported both by
arbitration decisions and by international treaties
designed to unify certain rules of conflict in relation
to contracts.
The rule, which had already been cited in 1929 by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in its
judgment in the case of the  Brazilian Loans  (22), very
clearly underlay the award made by the arbitration
tribunal on 29 August 1958 in  Saudi Arabia 
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)  in which
it was stated that the 'principles of private
international law to be consulted in order to find the
law applicable are those relating to freedom of
choice, by virtue of which, in an agreement which is
international in character, the law expressly chosen
by the parties must be applied first. . .' (23). Similarly
in the arbitration findings given on 15 March 1963 in
Sapphire International PeuoJeums Ltd v. National
Iranian Oil Company,  the sole arbitrator, Mr Cavin
affirmed that it is the will of the parties that
determines the law applicable in matters of
contract (24). The rule was reaffirmed even more
recently by the sole arbitrator, Mr Dupuy, in the
award which he made on 19 January 1977 in  Libyan
Arab Republic v. California Asiatic Oil Company
and. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company  (25).
As regards international treaties, the rule of freedom
of choice has been adopted in the Convention on the
law applicable to international sales of goods
concluded at the Hague on 15 June 1955 which
entered into force on 1 September 1964. Article 2 of
this Convention, which is in force among several
European countries, provides that: 'The sale shall be
governed by the internal law of the country
nominated by the contracting parties.
Article VIII of the European Convention on
international commercial arbitration concluded at
Geneva on 21 April 1961, which entered into force on
7 January 1964, provides that the parties are free to
determine the law which the arbitrators must apply in
a dispute.
The same principle forms the basis of the 1965
Convention for the settlement of disputes relating to
investments between States and nationals of other
States, which entered into force on 14 October 1966
when it provides in Article 42 that 'the Tribunal shall
rule on the dispute in accordance with the rules of
law adopted by the parties
The Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the law
applicable to agency provides in Article 5 that ' the
internal law chosen by the principal and the agent is to govern the agency relationship between
them' (26).31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/17
3. The parties' choice must be  express or be
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms
of the contract -or the circumstances of the case. This
interpretation, which emerges from the sesond
sentence of Article 3 (1), has an important consequence. 
The choice of law by the parties will often be express
but the Convention recognizes the possibility that the
Court may, in the light of all the facts, find that the
parties have made a real choice oflaw although this is
not expressly stated in the contract. For example, the
contract may be in a standard form which is known
to be governed by a particular system of law even
though there is no express statement to this effect
such as a Lloyd's policy of marine insurance. In other
cases a previous course of dealing between the parties
under contracts containing an express choice of law
may leave the court in no doubt that the contract in
question is to be governed by the law previously
chosen where the choice of law clause has been
omitted in circumstances which do not indicate a
deliberate change of policy by the parties. In some
cases the choice of a particular forum may show in no
uncertain manner that the parties intend the contract
to be governed by the law of that forum, but this must
always be subject to the other terms of the cntract and
all the circumstances of the case. Similarly references
in a contract to specific Articles of the French Civil
Code may leave the court in no doubt that the parties
have deliberately chosen French law, although there
is no expressly stated choice of law. Other matters
that may impel the court to the conclusion that a real
choice of law has been made might include an
express choice of law in related transactions between
the same parties, or the choice of a place where
disputes are to be settled by arbitration in
circumstances indicating that the arbitrator should
apply the law of that place.
This Article does .not permit the court to infer a
choice of law that the parties might have made where
they had no clear intention of making a choice. Such
a situation is governed by Article 4.
4. The last sentence of Article 3 (1) acknowledges
that the parties' choice of the law applicable may
relate to the whole of the contract or to only part
thereof. On the question whether severability
(depe~ge) was to be allowed, some experts observed
that the contract should in principle be governed by
one law, unless that contract, although apparently a
single contract, consists in reality of several contracts
or parts which are separable and independent of each
other from the legal and economic points of view. In
the opinion of these experts, no reference to
severability should have been made in the text of the
Convention itself. In the view of others, on the
contrary, severability is directly linked with the
principle of freedom of contract and so would be
difficult to prohibit. Nevertheless when the contract
is severable the choice must be logically consistent
i. e. it must relate to elements in the contract which
can be governed by different laws without giving rise
to contradictions. For example, an 'index-linking
clause' may be made subject to a different law; on the
other hand it is unlikely that repudiation of the
contract for non-performance would be subjected to
two different laws, one for the vendor and the other
for the purchaser. Recourse must be had to Article 4
of the Convention if the chosen laws cannot be
logically reconciled.
In the opinion of these experts the danger that the
argument of. severability might be used to avoid
certain mandatory provisions is eliminated by the
operation of Article 7. The experts concerned also
emphasized that severability should not be limited to
cases of express choice of law.
The solution adopted in the last sentence of Article
3 (1) is prompted by exactly this kind of idea. The
Group did not adoptthe idea that the judge can use a
partial choice of law as the basis for a presumption in
favour of one law invoked to govern the contract in
its entirety. Such an idea might be conducive to error
in situations in which the parties had reached
agreement on the choice of law solely on a specific
point. Recourse must be had to Article 4 in the case of
partial choice.
5. The first sentence of Article 3 (2) leaves the
parties maximum freedom as to the time at which the
choice of applicable law can be made.
It may be made either at the time the contract is
concluded or at an earlier or later date. The second
sentence of paragraph 2 also leaves the parties
maximum freedom as to amendment of the choice of
applicable law previously made.
The solution adopted by the Group in paragraph 2
corresponds only in part to what seems to be the
current state of the law on this point in the Member
States of the Community.
In the Federal Republic of Germany and in France
the choice of applicable law by the parties can
apparently be made even after the contract has been
concluded, and the courts sometimes deduce the
applicable law from the parties' attitude during the
proceedings when they refer with clear agreement to
a specific law. The power of the parties to vary the
choice of law applicable to their contract also seems
to be very widely accepted (27No C 282/18 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
Case law in the Netherlands seems to follow the same
line of interpretation (28).
In Italy, however, the Court of Cassation (sitting as a
full court) stated in its judgment of 28 June 1966 No
1680 in  Assael Nissim v. Crespi  that; 'the parties
choice of applicable law is not admissible if made
after the contract has been drawn up' (29).
According to this dictum which Italian
commentators do not wholly support (30) the choice
can be made only at the time the contract is
concluded. Once the choice is made, the parties no
longer have the option of agreeing to nominate a law
other than that nominated at the time of concluding
the contract.
In the laws of England and Wales, Scotland
Northern Ireland and Ireland, there is no clear
authority as to the law which governs the possibility
of a change in the proper law.
6. The liberal solution adopted by the Group seems
to be in accordance with the requirement of logical
consistency. Once the principle of freedom of
contract has been accepted, and having regard to the
fact that the requirement of a choice of law by the
parties may arise both at the time of conclusion of the
contract and after that time, it seems quite logical that
the power of the parties should not be limited solely
to the time of conclusion of the contract. The same
applies to a change (by a new agreement between the
parties) in the applicable law previously chosen.
As to the way in which the choice of law can be
changed, it is quite natural that this change should be
subject to the same rules as the initial choice.
If the choice of law is made or changed in the course
of proceedings the question arises as to the limits
within which the choice or change can be effective.
However, the question falls within the ambit of the-
national law of procedure, and can be settled only in
accordance with that law.
7. The second sentence of Article 3 (2) states that a
change in the applicable law after the contract has
been concluded shall not prejudice its formal validity
under Article 9 or adversely affect the rights of third
parties. The purpose of the reservation concerning
the formal validity of the contract is to avoid a
situation whereby the agreement between the parties
to subject the contract to a law other than that which
previously governed it could create doubts as to the
validity of the contract during the period preceding
the agreement between the parties. The preservation
of third-party rights appears to be entirely justified.
In certain legal systems, a third party may have
acquired rights in consequence of a contract
concluded betwen two other persons. These rights
cannot be affected by a subsequent change in the
choice of the applicable law.
8. Article 3 (3) provides that the choice of a foreign
law by the parties, whether or not accompanied by
the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of
the choice are connected with one country only,
prejudice the application of the law of that country
which cannot be derogated from by contract
hereinafter called 'mandatory rules
This solution is the result of a compromise between
two lines of argument which have been diligently
pursued within the Group: the wish on the one hand
of certain experts to limit the parties' freedom of
choice embodied in this Article by means of a
correcting factor specifying that the choice of a
foreign law would be insufficient  per se  to permit the
application of that law if the situation at the moment
of choice did not involve another foreign element
and on the other the concern of other experts
notably the United Kingdom experts, that such a
correcting factor would be too great an obstacle to
the freedom of the parties in situations in which their
choice appeared justified, made in good faith, and
capable of serving interests worthy of protection. In
particular these experts emphasized that departures
from the principle of the parties' freedom of choice
should be authorized only in exceptional
circumstances, such as the application of the
mandatory rules of a law other than that chosen by
the parties; they also gave several examples of cases
in which the choice of a foreign law by the parties was
fully justified, although there was apparently 
other foreign element in the situation.
The Group recognized that this concern was well
founded, while maintaining the principle that the
choice by the parties of a foreign law where all the
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of
the choice are connected with one country only shall
not prejudice the application of the mandatory rules
of the law of that country.
9. Article 3 (4) merely refers questions relating to
the existence and validity of the parties' consent as to
the choice of the law applicable to the provisions of
Articles 8, 9 and 11. We will return to these matters in
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Article 
Applicable law in the absence  of  choice
1. In default of an express or implied choice by the
parties, there is at present no uniform way of
determining the law applicable to contracts in the
legal systems of the: Member States of the
Community (31).
In French and Belgian law no distinction is to be
drawn between the express and hypothetical (or
presumed) will of the parties. Failing an express
choice of applicable law, the courts look for various
pointers' capable of  show~ng that the contract is
located in a particular country. This localization is
sometimes regarded subjectively as equivalent to the
probable wish of the parties had such a wish been
expressed, sometimes objectively as equivalent to the
country with which the transaction is most closely
connected (32).
The objective concept seems \to be receiving more
and more support from legal writers and from case
law. Following this concept, the Paris Court stated in
its judgment of 27 January 1955  (Soc. Jansen v. Soc.
Heurtey)  that, in default of an indication of the will
of the parties, the applicable law 'is determined
objectively by the fact that the contract is located by
its context and economic aspec1s in a particular
country, the place with which the transaction is most
closely connected being that in which the contract is
to be performed in fulfilment of the obligation
characteristic of its nature' (33).
It is this concept of the location of the contracts that
is referred to, in terms clearly modelled on the above
judgment, in the second paragraph of Article 2313 of
the French draft, which states that in default of the
expressed will of the parties 'the contract is governed
by the law with which it is most closely connected by
its economic aspects, and notably by the main place
of performance
Similarly, in German law the solution adopted by the
courts in determining the law of the contract in the
absence of choice by the parties is based largely upon
the search for 'pointers' capable of showing the
hypothetischer Parteiwille , the presumed will of the
parties, having regard to the general interests at stake
in each particular case. If this gives no result, the law
applicable to the contract according to, German case
law is determined by the place of performance: more
precisely, by the place of performanc(~ of each of the
obligations arising from the contraf;;t, because the
German courts take the view that if the various
contractual obligations are to be: performed in
different countries, each shall be governed by the law
of the country in which it is performed (34).
In English law where the parties have not expressly
chosen the proper law and no choice can be inferred
the law applicable to the contract is the system of law
with which the transaction has its 'closest and most
real connection' (35). In such a case the judge does
not seek to ascertain the actual intensions of the
contracting parties, because that is non-existent, but
seeks 'to determine for the parties what is the proper
law which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought
to have intended if they had thought about the
question when they made the contract' (36). In this
inquiry, the court has to consider all the
circumstances of the case. No one factor is decisive;
instead a wide range of factors must be taken into
account, such as for instance, the place of residence
or business of the parties, the place of performance
the place of contracting and the nature and subject-
matter of the contract.
Scots law adopts a similar approach (36a), as does the
law of Ireland.
In Italian law, where the presumed will of the parties
plays no part, the matter is settled expressly and
directly by the legislature. Failing a choice of law by
the parties, the obligations arising from the contract
are governed by the following:
(a) contracts for employment on board foreign
ships or aircraft, by the national law of the ship
or aircraft (Naval Code Article 9);
(b) marine, domestic and air hiring contracts
charters and transport contracts, by the national
law of the ship or aircraft (Naval Code Article
10);
(c) all other contracts, by the national law of the
contracting parties, if common to both;
otherwise by the law of the place where the
contract was concluded (preliminary provisions of the Civil Code Article 25 first
subparagraph ).
The abovementioned laws are of subsidiary effect
only; they apply only in default of an expression of
the parties' will as to the law applicable. Italian case
law so holds and legal writers concur with this
view (37).
To conclude this short survey, only the provisions of
the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 13 of the
1969 Benelux Treaty which has not entered into force
remain to be mentioned. According to the third
paragraph, in default of a choice by the parties 'theNo C 282/20 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
contract shall be governed by the law of the country
with which it is most closely connected', an
according to the fourth paragraph 'when it 
impossible to determine that country, the contract
shall be governed by the law of the country In which
it was, concluded' One may note a tendency 
Netherlands case law to formulate special rules of
reference for certain types of contract (see ' Journal
du Droit Int. 1978
, pp. 
336 to 344' and ' Neth. Int.
Law Rev. 1974
, pp 
315 to 316'), i. e. contracts of
employment, agency contracts and comracrs of
carnage.
The foregoing survey has shown that, with the sole
exception of Italy, where the subsidiary law
applicable to the contract is detennined once and for
all by hard-and-fast connecting factors, all the other
Community countries have preferred and continue to
prefer a more flexible approach, leaving the judge to
select the preponderant and decisive connecting
factor for determining the law applicable to the
contract in each specific case among the various
elements of the contract and the CIrcumstances of the
case.
2. Having considered the advantages and
disadvantages of the solutions adopted by the
legislatures and the case law of the Member States of
the Community and after analyzing a range of ideas
and alternatives advanced both by the rapporteur
and by several delegates, the Group agreed upon the
uniform rule embodied in Article 
The first paragraph of this Article provides that, in
default of a choice by the parties, the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country with which it has
the closest connection.
In order to determine the country with which the
contract is most closely connected, it is also possible
to take account of factors which supervened after the
conclusion of the contract.
In fact the beginning of the first paragraph does not
mention default of choice by the parties ~ the
expression used is ' to the extent that the law
applicable to the contract has not been chosen in
accordance with Article 3'. The use of these words is
justified by reference to what has been said in
paragraph 4 of the commentary on Article 
However, the flexibility of the general principle
established by paragraph I is substantially modified
by the presumptions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and by
a strictly limited exception in favour of severability at
the end of paragraph 
3. According to Article 4 (2), it. is presumed that the
contract has the closest connecjLlon with the country
in which the party who is to effect the performance
which is characteristic of the c('Jntract has his habitual
residence at the time when the contract is concluded
, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate
its central administration. If the contract 
concluded by that party in tht course of his trade or
profession, the country conc(~rned is that in which his
principal place of business is situated or, if the
contract is to be performec through a place of
business other than the prmclpal place of business
the ,:ountry in which that other place of business is
situated. Article 4 (2) e;stablishes a presumption
whi,~h may t)e rebutted iu accordance with Article 
(5).
The kind of idea upon yvhich paragraph 2 is based is
certainly not entirely uI'Lknown to some specialists. It
gives effect to a tendency which has been gaining
ground both in legal writings and in case law in many
countries in recent decades  C8).  The submission of
the contract, in the abs'ence of a choice by the parties,
to the law appropriate l.O the characteristic
performance defines the connecting factor of the
contract from the inside, and not from the outside by
elements unrelated LO the es:,ence of the obligation
such as the nationality of the contracting parties or
the place w here the contract was concluded.
In addition it is possible to relate the concept of
characteristlc per:formance to an even more general
idea, namely thf~ idea that his performance refers to
the function which the legal relationship involved
fulfils in the economic and social life of any country.
The concept IJf characteristic performance essentially
links the (;ontract to the social and economic
environment of which it will form a part.
Identifying the characteristIc performance of 
contract obviQusly presents no difficulty in the case
of unilc.teral contracts. By contrast, in bilateral
(reciprocal) contracts whereby the parties undertake
mutual. reciprocal perfonnance the coumer-
performance by one of the parties in a modern
economy usmally takes the form of money. This is
not. of course, the characteristic performance of the
con tract. It is the performance for which the payment
is due, i.  e. depending on the type of contract, the
ddivery of goods, the granting of the right to make
u:;e of an item of property, the provision of a service,
transport, insurance, banking operations, security,
,~tc" which usually constitutes the centre of gravity
and the sodo-,~conomic function of the contractual
transaction
As for the geogI'aphicallocation of the characteristic
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which the party liable for the performance is
habitually resident or has his central administration
(if a body corporate or unincorporate) or his place of
business, according to whether the performance in
question is in the course of his trade or profession or
not, should prevail over the country of performance
where, of course, the latter is a country other than
that of habitual residence, central administration or
the place of business. In the solution adopted by the
Group the position is that only the place of habitual
residence or of the (;entral administration or of the
place of business of the party providing the essential
performance is decisive in locating the contract.
Thus, for example, in a banking contract the law of
the country of the banking establishment with which
the transaction is made will normally govern the
contract. It is usually the case in a commercial
contract of sale that the law of the vendor s plac.e of
business will govern the contract. To take another
example, in an agency contract concluded in France
between a Belgian commercial agent and a French
company, the characteristic performance being that
of the agent, the contract will be governed by Belgian
law if the agent has his place of business in
Belgium (39).
In conclusion, Article 4 (2) gives specific form and
objectivity to the, in itself, too vague concept of
closest connection . At the same time it greatly
simplifies the problem of determining the law
applicable to the contract in default of choice by the
parties. The place where the act was done becomes
unimportant. There is no longer any need 
determine where the contract was concluded, with all
the difficulties and the problems of classification that
arise in practice. Seeking the place of performance or
the different places of performance and classifying
them becomes superfluous.
For each category of contract it is the characteristic
performance that is in principle the relevant factor in
applying the presumption for determining the
applicable law, even in situations peculiar to certain
contracts, as for example in the contract of guarantee
.where the characteristic performance is always that
of the guarantor, whether in relation to the principal
debtor or the creditor.
To counter the possibility of changes in the
connecting factor Cconflits mobiles in the
application of paragraph 2, it has been made clear
that the country of habitual residence or of the
principal place of business of the party providing the
characteristic performance is the country in which he is habitually resident or has his central
administration or place of business, as appropriate
at the time of conclusion of the contract
According to the last part of paragraph 2, if the
contract prescribes performance by an establishment
other than the principal place of business, it is
presumed that the contract has the closest connection
with the country of that other establishment.
4. Article 4 (3) establishes that the presumption in
paragraph 2 does not operate to the extent that the
subject of the contract is a right in immovable
property or a right to use immovable property. It is
presumed in this case that the contract is most closely
connected with the country in which the immovable
property is situated.
It is advisable to state that the provision in question
merely establishes a presumption in favour of the law
of the country in whkh the immovable property is
situate. In other words this is a presumption which,
like that in paragraph 2, could also be rebutted if
circumstances so required.
For example, this presumption could be rebutted if
two persons resident in Belgium were to make a
contract for renting a holiday home on the island of
Elba (Italy). It might be thought In such a case ' that
the contract was most closely connected with the
country of the contracting parties' residence, not with
Italy.
Finally it sliould be stressed that paragraph 3 does
not extend to contracts for the construction or repair
of immovable property. This is because the main
subject-matter of these contracts is the construction
or repair rather than the immovable property itself.
5. After a long and animated discussion the Group
decided to include transport contracts within the
scope of the convention. However, the Group
deemed it inappropriate to submit contracts for the
carriage of goods to the presumption contained in
paragraph 2, ha ving regard to the peculiarities of this
type of transport. The contract for carriage of goods
is therefore made subject to a presumption of its own
namely that embodied in paragraph 4. This
presumption may be rebutted in accordance with
Article 4 (5).
According to this fourth paragraph it is presumed in
the case of contracts for the carriage of goods that if
the country in which the carrier has his principal
place of business at the time the contract is concluded
is also the country of the place of loading or
unloading or of the principal place of business of the
consignor, the contract is most closely connected
with that country. The term 'consignor' refers in
general to any person who consigns goods to theNo C 282/22 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
carrier (Afzender, Aflader, Verzender, Mittente
Caricatore, etc.
Thus the paragraph 4 presumption rests upon a
combination of connecting factors. To counter the
possibility of changes in the connecting factor in
applying the paragraph, it has been made clear here
also that the reference to the country in which the
carrier has his principal place of business must be
taken to refer to the carrier s place of business 'at the
time the contract is concluded'
It appears that for purposes of the application of this
paragraph the places ofloading and unloading which
enter into consideration are those agreed at the time
when the contract is concluded.
It often happens in contracts for carriage that a
person who contracts to carry goods for another does
not carry them himself but arranges for a third party
to do so. In Article 4 (4) the term 'the carrier' means
the party to the contract who undertakes to carry the
goods, whether or not he performs the carriage
himself.
In addition, the third sentence of paragraph 
provides that in applying that paragraph single-
voyage charterparties and other contracts whose
main purpose is the carriage of goods shall be treated
as contracts for the carriage of goods. The wording of
paragraph 4 is intended to make it clear that
charterparties may be considered to be contracts for
the carriage of goods in so far as that is their
substance.
6. Contracts for the carriage of passengers remain
subject to the general presumption, i. e. that provided
for in Article 4 (2).
This solution was adopted by majority vote within
the Group. Certain delegations favoured the special
presumption emodied in paragraph 4, arguing that
as with other types of transport, the need was for a
combination of connecting factors, in view of the fact
that reference solely to the place where the carrier
who provides the characteristic performance, has his
principal place of business may not be a significant
connecting factor: by way of example they cited the
case of transportation of French or English
passengers between London and Paris by 
American airline. It was also emphasized that in 
mixed contract (passengers and goods) the difficulty
of applying two different laws would arise.
Nevertheless the other delegations were against the
special presumption their principal arguments
being: the application of several laws to passengers
on the same journey would involve serious
difficulties; the formulation of paragraph 4 is such
that it would hardly ever apply to carriage of
passengers, so recourse would usually be had to the
first paragraph of Article 4, which does not give the
judge sufficiently precise criteria for decision;
contracts of carriage normally contain a clause
conferring jurisdiction on the court of the carrier
principal place of business, and paragraph 2 would
operate so that the law of the court of competent
jurisdiction would coincide with the applicable
law.
In any event it should be stated that the judge will not
be able to exclude consideration of the country in
which the carrier has his principal place of business
in seeking the places with which the contract is most
closely connected.
Finally it is useful to note that the Group repeatedly
stressed in the course of the discussions on transport
problems that the international conventions took
precedence in this matter.
7. Article 4 (2) does not apply when the
characteristic performance connot be determined.
The case then falls under paragraph I i. e. the
contract will be governed by the law of the country
with which it is most closely connected.
The first part of Article 4 (5) contains precisely that
provision.
However, that paragraph also provides for the
possibility of disregarding the presumptions 
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 when all the circumstances
show the contract to have closer connections with
another country. In this case the law of that other
country is applied.
The grounds for the latter provision are as follows.
Given the entirely general nature of the conflict rule
contained in Article 4, the only exemptions to which
are certain contracts made by consumers and
contracts of employment, it seemed essential to
provide for the possibility of applying a law other
than those referred to in the presumptions in
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 whenever all the circumstances
show the contract to be more closely connected with
another country.
Article 4 (5) obviously leaves the judge a margin 
discretion as to whether a set of circumstances exists
in each specific case justifying the non-application of
the presumptions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. But this is
the inevitable counterpart of a general conflict rule
intended to apply to almost all types of contract.31. 10. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/23
8. Article 4 (I) allows parts of the contract to be
severed under certain conditions. The last sentence of
this paragraph provides that if one part of the
contract can be separated from the rest and is more
closely connected with another country, then by way
of exception the law of that other country can be
applied to that part of the contract.
Discussion of the matter within the Group revealed
that no delegation wished to encourage the idea of
severability (depe~ge). However, most of the experts
were in favour of allowing the court to effect a
severance, by way of exception, for a part of the
contract which is independent and separable, in
terms of the contract and not of the dispute, where
that part has a closer connection with another
country (for example, contracts for joint venture,
complex contracts).
As to whether or not the possibility of severance
should be mentioned in the text of the convention
itself most delegations were in favour of its being
mentioned. It was emphasized in particular that mere
reference to the matter in the report would be
insufficient by itself, because in some Member States
of the Community it is not usual to take account of
the report. It was also emphasized that to include it in
the text would reduce the risk of variation in the
application of the convention on this point, because
the text would specify the conditions under which
severance was allowed.
The wording of the last sentence in paragraph I
embodies precisely this idea. The words 'by way of
exception' are therefore to be interpreted in the sense
that the court must have recourse to severance as
seldom as possible.
9. It should be noted that the presumptions
mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 4 are
only rebuttable presumptions.
Article 
Certain consumer contracts
1. Article 5 of the convention establishes a specific
conflict rule for certain contracts made by
consumers. Most of the experts who have
participated in the Group s work since 1973 have
taken the view that consumer protection, the present
aim of several national legislatures, would entail a
reversal of the connecting factor provided for in
Article 4 or a modification of the principle of
freedom of choice provided for in Article 3. On the
one hand the choice of the parties should not
adversely affect the mandatory provisions of the
State in which the consumer is habitually resident; 
the other, in this type of contract it is the law of the
buyer (the weaker party) which should normally
prevail over that of the seller.
2. The definition of consumer contracts
corresponds to that contained in Article 13 of the
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments. It should be interpreted in the light of its
purpose which is to protect the weaker party and in
accordance with other international instruments with
the same purpose such as the Judgments Convention.
Thus, in the opinion of the majority of the
delegations it will, normally, only apply where the
person who supplies goods or services or provides
credit acts in the course of his trade or profession.
Similarly, the rule does not apply to contracts made
by traders, manufacturers or persons in the exercise
of a profession (doctors, for example) who buy
equipment or obtain services for that trade 
profession. If such a person acts partly within, partly
outside his trade or profession the situation only falls
within the scope of Article 5 if he acts primarily
outside his trade or profession. Where the receiver of
goods or services or credit in fact acted primarily
outside his trade or profession but the other party did
not know this and, taking all the circumstances into
account should not reasonably have known it, the
situation falls outside the scope of Article 5. Thus if
the receiver of goods or services holds himself out as
a professional, e. g. by ordering goods which might
well be used in his trade or profession on his
professional paper the good faith of the other party is
protected and the case will not be governed by
Article 5.
The rule extends to credit sales as well as to cash
sales, but sales of securities are excluded. The Group
has specifically avoided a more precise definition of
consumer contract' in order to avoid conflict with
the various definitions already given by national
legislation. The rule also applies to the supply of
services, such as insurance, as well as supply of
goods.
3. Paragraph 2 embodies the principle that a choice
of law in a consumer contract cannot deprive the
consumer of the protection afforded to him by the
law of the country in which he has his habitual
residence. This principle shall, however, only apply
under certain conditions set out in the three indents
of paragraph 
The first indent reales to situations where the trader
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country where the consumer resides. It is intended to
cover  inter alia  mail order and door-step selling.
Thus the trader must have done certain acts such as
advertising in the press, or on radio or television, or
in the cinema or by catalogues aimed specifically at
that country, or he must have made business
proposals individually through a middleman or by
canvassing. If, for example, a German makes a
contract in response to an advertisement published
by a French company in a German publication, the
contract is covered by the special rule. If, on the other
hand, the German repFes to an advertisement in
American publications, even if they are sold in
Germany, the rule does not apply unless the
advertisement appeared in special editions of the
publication intended for European countries. In the
latter case the seller will have made a special
advertisement intended for the country of the
purchaser.
The Group expressly adopted the words 'steps
necessary on his part' in order to avoid the classic
problem of determining the place where the contract
was concluded. This is a particularly delicate matter
in the situations referred to, because it involves
international contracts normally concluded by
correspondence. The word 'steps' includes  inter alia
writing or any action taken in consequence of an
offer or advertisement.
According to the second indent Article 5 shall apply
in all situations where the trader or his agent has
received the order of the consumer in the country in
which the consumer has his habitual residence. This
provision is a parallel to Article 3 (2) of the 1955
Hague Convention on international sales
There is a considerable overlap between the first and
the second indents. This overlap is, however, not
complete. For example, the second indent applies in
situations where the consumer has addressed himself
to the stand of a foreign firm at a fair or exhibition
taking place in the consumers country or to a
permanent branch or agency of a foreign firm
established in the consumer s country even though
the foreign firm has not advertised in the consumer
country in a way covered by the first indent. The
word 'agent' is intended to cover all persons acting
on behalf of the trader.
The third indent deals with a situation which is rather
special but where, on the other hand, a majority of
delegations found a clear need for protecting the
consumer under the provisions of Article 5. It covers
what one might describe as 'border-crossing
excursion-selling , i. e. for example, a situation where
a store-owner in country A arranges one-day bus
trips for consumers in a neighbouring country B with
the main purpose of inducing the consumers to buy
in his store. This is a practice well-known in some
areas. The situation is not covered by the first indent
because there it is required that the consumer has
taken in his own country all the steps necessary on his
part for the conclusion of the contract. The third
indent is, unlike the rest of paragraph 2, limited to
contracts for the sale of goods. The condition that the
journey was arranged by the seller shall not be
understood in the narrow way that the seller must
himself have taken care of the transportation. It is
sufficient that the seller has arranged the journey by
way of an agreement with the transportation
company.
In describing the situation in which Article 5 applies
to consumer contracts, the (:Jroup has not followed
the text of Article 13 (1) of the Judgments
Convention as amended by the Accession
Convention. On the one hand Article 5 contains no
special provision for hire purchase contracts and
loans on deferred terms. On the other hand, Article
13 of the Judgments Convention has no provisions
parallel to the second and third indents of Article 5
(2,.
4. Article 5 (3) introduces an exception to Article 4
of the Convention. According to this paragraph
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4 and in the
absence of choice in accordance with Article 3 , a
contract made by a consumer shall 'be governed by
the law of the country in whkh the consumer has his
habitual residence if. it is entered into in the
circumstances described in the second paragraph of
Article 5'
The wording of paragraph 3 is sufficiently clear, and
calls for no additional examination.
5. Under the terms of paragraph 4 thereof, Article 5
applies neither to contracts of carriage (a) nor to
contracts relating to the supply of services provided
exclusively in a country other than that in which the
consumer is resident (b). The exclusion of contracts
of carriag,; is justified by the fact that the special
protective measures for which provision is made in
Article 5 are not appropriate for governing contracts
of this type. Similarly, in the case of contracts
relating to the supply of services (for example
accommodation in a hotel, or a language course)
which are supplied exclusively outside the State in
which the consumer is resident, the latter ca~not
reasonably expect the law of his State of origin to be
applied in derogation from the general rules of
AI1icles 3 ,md 4. in the cases referred to under (b) the
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which the oth,er contracting party is resident, even if
the latter has performed one of the acts described in
paragraph 2 ( advertising, for example) in the State in
which the consumer is resident.
6. The intention of paragraph 5 is to ensure that
Article 5, notwithstanding the exclusions made in
paragraph 4, shall apply to contracts providing for
what is ir, English normally called a 'package tour
i. e. an QT'dinary tourist arrangement consisting of a
combination of travel and accommodation for an
inclusive price. If a package tour starts with
transpOJ.tation from the country in which the
consum er has his habitual residence the contract
would not be excluded according to paragraph 4. The
import:ance of paragraph 5 is, therefore, that it
ensures application of Article 5 also in situations
where the services provided for under a package tour
start with transportation from another country.
Howf~ver, Article :; of course only applies to package
tours where the general conditions of paragraphs 
and 2 are fulfilled i. e. that the contract can be
regarded as a consumer contract and that it is entered
into in one of the situations mentioned in
par' agraph 2.
Wben formulating paragraph 5, the Group met with
difficulty in defining a ' package tour . The Group
confined itself to a definition which underlines the
m2Lin elements of this type of contract well known in
practice, leaving it to the courts to solve any possible
doubt as to the exact delimitation. The
ac;commodation which is a part of a package tour
must normally be separate from the transportation
and so paragraph 5 would not apply to the provision
of a sleeper on a train.
Article 
Individual employment contracts
1. Re-examination of the specific conflict rule in
the matter of contracts of employment led the Group
to make fundamental changes to this Article, which
already appeared (as Article 5) in the original
preliminary draft, and to harmonize its approach
with that of the present Article 5 on consumer
contracts.
In both cases the question was one of finding a more
appropriate arrangement for matters in which the
interests of one of the contracting parties are not the
same as those of the other, and at the same time to
secure thereby more adequate protection for the
party who from the socia-economic point of view is
regarded as the weaker in the contractual
relationship.
2. On this basis, Article 6 (1) sets a limit on the
parties' freedom to choose the  applicable law, as
permitted by Article 3 of the convention, affirming
that this choice in contracts of employment 'shall not
have the result of depriving the employee of the
protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of
the law which would be applicable under paragraph
2 in the absence of choice
The purpose of this text is as follows:
if the law applicable pursuant to paragraph 2 grants
employees protection which is greater than that
resulting from the law chosen by the parties, the
result is not that the choice of this law becomes
completely without effect. On the contrary, in this
case the law which was chosen continues in principle
to be applicable. In so far as the provisions of the law
applicable pursuant to paragraph 2 give employees
better protection than the chosen law, for example by
giving a longer period of notice, these provisions set
the provisions of the chosen law aside and are
applicable in their place.
The mandatory rules from which the parties may not
derogate conSIst not only of the provisions relating to
the contract of employment itself, but also provisions
such as those concerning industrial safety and
hygiene which are regarded in certain Member States
as being provisions of public law.
It follows from this text that if the law of the country
designated by Article 6 (2) makes the collective
employment agreements binding for the employer
the employee will not be deprived of the protection
afforded to him by these collective employment
agreements by the choice of law of another State in
the individual employment contract.
Article 6 applies to individual employment contracts
and not to collective agreements. Col1sequently, the
fact that an employment contract is governed by a
foreign law cannot affect the powers which an
employee s trade union might derive from collective
agreements in its own country.
The present wording of Article 6 speaks of ' contract
of employment' instead of 'employment relationship
as in the original preliminary draft. It should be
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the case of void contracts and also  de facto
employment relationships in particular those
characterized by failure to respect the contract
imposed by law for the protection of employees.
3. According to Article 6 (2), in the absence of
choice by the parties and notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 4, the contract of employment is
governed as follows:
(a) by the law of the country in which the employee
habitually carries out his work in performance
of his contract, even if he is temporarily
employed in another country; or
(b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his
work in any one country, by the law of the
country in which the place of business through
which he was engaged is situated
unless it appears from the cirumstances as a whole
that the contract of employment is more closely
connected with another country, in which case the
law of that other country applies.
After a thorough examination of the various
problems raised by contracts of employment in
private international law, in the course of which
particular consideration was given both to the draft
Regulation prepared in this connection by the EEC
Commission and to the latest trends in the legal
literature and case law of the Member States of the
Community, the Group finally adopted the following
solution. If the employee habitually works in one and
the same country the contract of employment is
governed by the law of that country even if the
employee is temporarily employed in another
country. This is the rule which appears in
subparagraph 2 (a). On the other hand, if the
employee does not habitually work in one and the
same country the contract of employment is
governed by the law of the country in which the place
of business through which he was engaged is situated.
This is the rule which appears in subparagraph 2
(b).
These solutions obviously differ substantially from
those which would have resulted from the Article 4
presumption.
However, the last sentence of Article 6 (2) provides
that if it appears from the cirumstances as a whole
that the contract is more closely connected with
another country, the law of the latter country is
applied.
4. As regards work done outside the jurisdiction of
any State, the Group considered that the rule
adopted in Article 6 could in principle be applied. In
the case of work on an oil-rig platform on the high
seas, the law of the country of the undertaking which
engaged the employee should be applied.
The Group did not seek a special rule for the work of
members of the crew on board a ship.
Article 
Mandatory rules
I. The wording of Article 7 of the original
preliminary draft has been considerably improved in
the course of the Group s re-examination of the text
of the convention since 1973, in order to permit a
better interpretation in the various situations in
which it will have to be applied.
The Group reiterated at its last meeting that Article 7
merely embodies principles which already exist in the
laws of the Member States of the Community.
The principle that national courts can give effect
under certain conditions to mandatory provisions
other than those applicable to the contract by virtue
of the choice of the parties or by virtue of a subsidiary
connecting factor, has been recognized for several
years both in legal writings and in practice in certain
of our countries and elsewhere.
For example, the principle was recognized in the
abovementioned 1966 judgment of the Netherlands
Supreme Court in the  Alnati  case (cited  supra
commentary on Article 3 (1)) in which the Court said
that, although the law applicable to contracts of an
international character can, as a matter of principle,
only be that which the parties themselves have
chosen
, '
it may be that, for a foreign State, the
observance of certain of its rules, even outside its
own territory, is of such importance that the courts
must take account of them, and hence apply them in
preference to the law of another State which may
have been chosen by the parties to govern their
contract' .
This judgment formed the basis for the second
paragraph of Article 13 of the non-entered-into-force
Benelux Treaty of 1969 on uniform rules of private
international law, which provides that 'where the
contract is manifestly connected with a particular
country, the intention of the parties shall not have the
effect of excluding the provisions of the law of that
country which, by reason of their special nature and
subject-matter, exclude the application of any other
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The same attitude, at any event, underlies Article 
of the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the
law applicable to agency, whereby, in the application
of that convention, effect may be given to the
mandatory rules of any State with which the situation
has a significant connection, if and to the extent that,
by the law of that State, those rules are applicable
irrespective of the law indicated by its confluct
rules.
On the other hand, despite the opinion of some
jurists, it must be frankly recognized that no clear
indication in favour of the principle in question
seems discernible in the English cases  (Ralli Bros 
Sota y Aznar; Regazzoni v. Sethia; Rossano 
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (40).
2. The wording of Article 7 (I) specifically provides
that in the application of the convention 'effect may
be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another
country with which the situation has a close
connection if and in so far as, under the law of the
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever
the law applicable to the contract'
The former text did not specify the nature of the
connection' which must exist between the contract
and a country other than that whose law 
applicable. Several experts have observed that this
omission might oblige the court in certain cases to
take a large number of different and even
contradictory laws into account. This lack of
precision could make the court's task difficult,
prolong the proceedings, and lend itself to delaying
tactics. Accepting the force of these observations, the
Group decided that it is essential that there be 
genuine connection with the other country, and that a
merely vague connection is not adequate. For
example, there would be a genuine connection when
the contract is to be performed in that other country
or when one party is resident or has his main place of
business in that other country. Among the suggested
versions, the Group finally adopted the word ' close
which seemed the most suitable to define the
situation which it wished to cover.
The connection in question must exist between the
contract as a whole and the law of a country other
than that to which the contract is submitted. The
Group rejected the proposal by one delegation
designed to establish a connection between the point
in dispute and a specific law. In fact this proposal
would have given rise to a regrettable dismember-
ment of the contract and would have led to the
application of mandatory laws not foreseeable by
the parties. Nevertheless the Group preferred to
replace the word 'the contracts' by 'the situation
Since the former text seemed to some delegations to
be lacking in clarity, the Group decided to improve
the wording. In the new text it has therefore stated
that the legal system of the country of which these
mandatory provisions are an integral part must be
examined to find out whether these provisions apply
in the particular case whatever the law applicable to
the contract. Furthermore, in the French text the
word 'loi' has been replaced by the word ' droit' in
order to avoid any doubts as to the scope of the rule
which is to cover both 'legislative' provisions of any
other country and also common law rules. Finally,
after a long discussion, the majority of the Group, in
view of the concern expressed by certain delegations
in relation to constitutional difficulties, decided that
it was preferable to allow the courts a discretion in
the application of this Article.
3. Article 7 (1) adds in relation to the mandatory
rules that their nature and purpose, and the
consequences of their application or non-
application, must be taken into account in order to
decide whether effect should be given to them.
Thus the application of the mandatory provisions of
any other country must be justified by their nature
and by their purpose. One delegation had suggested
that this should be defined by saying that the nature
and purpose of the provisions in question should be
established according to internationally recognized
criteria (for example, similar laws existing in other
countries or which serve a generally recognized
interest). However, other experts pointed out that
these international criteria did not exist and that
consequently difficulties would be created for the
court. Moreover this formula would touch upon the
delicate matter of the credit to be given to foreign
legal systems. For these reasons the Group, while not
disapproving this idea, did not adopt this drafting
proposal.
Additionally, in considering whether to give effect to
these mandatory rules, regard must be had to ' the
consequences of their application or non-
application
Far from weakening the rule this subsequent element
which did not appear in the original preliminary
draft - defines, clarifies and strengthens it. In fact,
the judge must be given a power of discretion, in
particular in the case where contradictory mandatory
rules of two different countries both purport
simultaneously to be applicable to one and the same
situation, and where a choice must necessarily be
made between them.
To complete the comments on Article 7 (1) it only
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given' impose on the court the extremely delicate task
of combining the mandatory provisions with the law
normally applicable to the contract in the particular
situation in question. The novelty of this provision
and the fear of the uncertainty to which it could give
rise, have led some delegations to a!'.k that 
reservation may be entered on Article 7 (1) (see
Article 22 (1) (a)).
4. Article 7 (2) states that 'nothing in this
Convention shall restrict the application of the rules
of the law of the forum in a situation where they are
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract'.
The origin of this paragraph is found in the concern
of certain delegations to safeguard the nlles of the
law of the forum (notably rules on cartels.
competition and restrictive practices, consumer
protection and certain rules concerning carriage)
which are mandatory in the situation whatever the
law applicable to the contract may be. 
Thus the paragraph merely deals with the application
of mandatory. rules (lois d'application immediate:
leggi di applicazione necessaria. etc) in a different
way from paragraph 1 (40a
Article 
Material validity
I. Article 8 \ I) provides that the existence and
validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract
shall be determined by the law which would govern it
under this Convention if the contract or term were
valid.
The paragraph is intended to cover all aspects of
formation of the contract other than general validity.
As we have emphasized previously in paragraph 9 of
the comments on Article 3, thIS provision is also
applicable with regard to the existence and validity of
the parties' consent as to choice of the law
applicable.
The word 'term' has been adopted to cover cases in
which there is a dispute as to the validity of a term of
the contract, such as a choice of law clause.
2. Notwithstanding the general rule in paragraph I
paragraph 2 provides a special rule which relates
only to the existence and not to the validity of
consent.
According to this special rule a party may rely upon
the law of the country in which he has his habitual
residence to establish that he did not consent if it
appears from the circumstances that it would not be
reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in
accordance with the law specified in paragraph t.
The solution adopted by the Group in this respect is
designed  infer alia  to solve the problem of the
implications of silence by one party as to the
. formation i)f the contract.
The word 'conduct' must be taken to cover both
action and failure to act by the party in question; it
does not, therefore, relate solely to silence.
The words ' if it appears from the circumstances
mean that the court must have regard to all the
circumstances of the case, not solely to those in which
the party claiming that he has not consented to the
contract has acted. The Court will give particular
consideration to the practices followed by the parties
inter se  as well as their previous business
relationships.
According to the circumstances, the words 'a party
can relate either to the offeror or to the offeree.
The application of paragraph 2 can result in a
decision releasing a party who would have been
bound under the terms of paragraph 1 , but it can
never produce the opposite effect of holding that a
contract exists which is non-existent by its proper
law.
Article 9 (4) contains a special rule relating to acts
intended to have legal effect, such as, in accordance
with the law of many countries, an offer. Such acts
have not been mentioned in Article 8. Nonetheless
the rules in Article 8 apply to such acts by way of
analogy.
Article 
Formal validity
Article 9 deals with the formal validity of contracts
and acts intended to have legal effect. The first four
paragraphs lay down rules governing all contracts
and acts intended to have legal effect. The last two
paragraphs lay down special rules peculiar to certain
types of contract.31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/29
General rules (paragraphs 1 to 4 inclusive)
The ~cope of these general rules needs to be specified
before indicating the various laws which they declare
to be applicable.
The scope of the general rules
1. Acts to which they apply.
Article 9 applies to contracts and unilateral acts
intended to have legal effect. The preliminary
draft of 1972 used only the term 'act intended to
have legal effect' (acte juridique) which, In the
terminology originating from Roman law
includes both categories. The inclusion in Article
9 of both contracts and acts intended to have legal
effect, mentioned successively, is due merely to a
wish to ensure darity, since the rules to be applied
are based on the same principles in both cases.
Unilateral acts intended to have legal effect which
fall within the scope of the Article are those which
are related to an existing or contemplated
contract. Acts relating to a concluded contract
can be extremely varied: notice of termination
remission of a debt, declaration of rescission or
repudiation, etc.
But the act must be connected wIth a contract. A
unilateral undertaking, unconnected with a
contract, as for example. in some legal systems, a
recognition of a debt not arising under a contract
or a unilateral act creating, transferring or
extinguishing a right  in rem would not fall within
the scope of Article 9 or of any other provision in
the Convention since the latter is concerned only
with contractual obligations.
Such an act must also, quite clearly, relate to a
contract falling within the scope of the
convention. Ar::icle 9 does not apply to the formal
validity of acts relating to contracts excluded
from the convention under Article 1 (2) and (3).
, There is no provision expressly referring to
public acts . This omission is intentional. First,
the concept of a public act is not recognized in all
the legal systems and could raise awkward
problems of definition. Moreover, it seems wrong
for there to be special provisions governing the
formal validity of private law aCts concluded
before public officials. Indeed, as has recently
been pointed out(4:), it is because a public official
can draw up an instrument only in accordance
with the law from which he derives his authority
that the formal validity for the act concluded
before him is necessarily subject to that Jaw. If
for example, a notary has not observed the law
from which he derives his authority, the contract
he has drawn up will not of course be a valid
notarial act. But it will not be entirely void if the
law which governs its substance (and which may
also determine its formal validity by virtue of
Article 9) does not require a special form for that
type of contract.
The genera! rules accordingly apply to ' public
act5 . This has the advantage of validating acts
drawn up by a public official who has thought it
appropriate, as happens in tbe Netherlands, to
follow the forms laid down i')y the foreign law
whi eh governs the substance of the contract.
2. Article 9 does not define what is to be understood
by the 'formal validity' of acts. It seemed realistic
to leave open this difficult problem of definition
esp,~cially as its importance has been slightly
reduced in consequence of the solutions found
for the problem of the connecting factor which to
some extent equate formal and material
validity.
It is nevertheless permissible to consider ' form
for the purposes of Article 9, as including every
external manifestation required on the part of a
person expressing the will to be legally bound
and in the absence of which such expression of
wiP would not be regarded as fully effective(42).
Th s definition does not include the special
requirements which have to be fulfilled where
there are persons under a disability to 
protected, such as the need in French law for the
consent of a family council to an act for the
benefit of a minor, or where an act is to be valid
against third parties, for example the need in
English la\\1 for a notice of a statutory assignment
of a chose in action.
La ws to be applied
I. The principle of applying in the alternative the
It' x causae  or the  lex loci actus.
The system contained in Article 9 is a
compromise between  favor negotii which tends
to take a liberal attitude regarding the formalities
required for acts, and the due observance of
formalities which, most often, is merely giving
eff\~ct to requirements of substance.
In supporting the former attitude, it did not seem
possible tc) follow the example of the Hague
Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning
conflict of laws with regard to testamentary
dispositions.  Favor testamenti  is justified by the
fact that a will is an act of final disposition which
by definition cannot be reenacted if its validity is
challenged after the testator death. 111is
consideration does not affect other acts intended
to have legal effect in the case of which excessive
freedom W'th regard to formalities would result inNo C 282/30 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
robbing of all effect the requirements in this field
which are specified by the various legal systems
very often with a legitimate aim in view.
Moreover, the connection between questions of
form and questions of evidence (Article 14)
makes it desirable to limit the number of laws
applicable to formal validity.
On the other hand, in order to avoid parties being
caught unawares by the annulment of their act on
the ground of an unexpected formal defect
Article 9 has, nonetheless, laid down a fairly
flexible system based on applying in the
alternative either the law of the place where the
contract was entered into (or in the case of a
unilateral act the law of the country where the act
was done) or else the law which governs its
substance.
This choice of applicable laws appears to be
sufficient and this is why the possibility of
applying the law of the common nationality or
habitual residence of the parties was rejected (43).
On the other hand no priority has been accorded
either to the  lex causae  or to the  lex loci actus. 
the act is valid to one of these two laws, that is
enough to prevent defects of form under the other
from affording grounds for nullity(44).
The Group did not examine the question of which
of the two laws would apply to an action brought
to annul the contract for formal defect in a case
where the contract would be null and void
according to both these laws. If, for example, the
limitation period for bringing an action for
annulment on the ground of a formal defect is not
the same in the two legal systems, it may seem to
be in keeping with the spirit of this Article to
apply the law which provides for the shorter
period and, in this respect, is more favourable
than the other to the validity of the act.
Renvoi must be rejected as regards formal
validity as in all other matters governed by the
Convention (cf. Article 15).
2. Problems raised by applying the law governing
the substance of the contract to the question of
formal validity
The  lex causae  is already recognized as
applicable, either as the principal law or as a
subsidiary option, to the question of formal
validity by the law of the Contracting States and
its application is fully justified by the logical
connection between substance and form(45).
The law governing the substance of the contract
must be determined by reference to Articles 3, 4
and 6 of the Convention (for contracts provided
for under Article 5, see II below, Special rules
peculiar to certain contracts). Article 3 (2)
specifically governs the formal consequences of a
voluntary change by the parties in the law
governing the substance of the contract. This text
means that, on this assumption of changes in the
connecting facts, it is enough for the contract to
be formally valid in accordance with one or other
of the laws successively called upon to govern the
substance of the contract.
A difficulty will arise when a contract is subject to
several laws, either because the parties have
selected the law applicable to a part only of their
contract (Article 3 (1)), or because the court itself
by way of exception, has proceeded to sever the
contract (Article 4 (1)). Which of the laws
governing the substance of the contract is to
determine its formal validity? In such a case it
would seem reasonable to apply the law
applicable to the part of the contract most closely
connected with the disputed condition on which
its formal validity depends.
Article 8 (1), dealing with material validity, says
that the existence and validity of a contract or of
any term of a contract shall be determined by the
law which would govern it under the Convention
if the contract or term were valid. This is to avoid
the circular argument that where there is a choice
of the applicable law no law can be said to be
applicable until the contract is found to be valid.
similar point arises in relation to formal
validity under Article 9, and although the text
does not expressly say so it is intended that ' the
law which governs it under this Convention
should be the law which would govern the
contract if it were formally valid.
3. Problems raised by applying the  locus regit actum
rule to the question of formal validity
The application of the law of the country in which
contract was entered into or in which a
unilateral act was done, in order to determine the
formal validity of the contract or act, results from
the age-old maxim  locus regit actum recognized
alike, usually as a principal rule, by the law of the
Contracting States (46).
However a classic difficulty arises in determining
the country in which the contract was entered into
when the contract has been made between
persons in different countries.
To resolve this difficulty it is first necessary to
describe exactly what is meant by persons being
or not being in the same country. Where the
contract is concluded through the offices of one
more agents, Article 9 (3) indicates clearly that
the place to be taken into consideration is where
the agents are acting at the time when the contract
is concluded. If the parties' agents (or one party
and the agent of the other) meet in a given
country and conclude the contract there, this
contract is considered, within the meaning of
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that country, even if the party or parties
respresented were in another country at the time.
Similarly, if the parties' agents (or one party and
the agent of the other) are in different countries at
the time when they conclude the contract, this
contract is considered, within the meaning of
paragraph 2, to be concluded between persons in
different countries even if both the parties
represented were in fact in the same country at the
time.
The question of finding which law is the law of
the place where the contract was entered into and
therefore determines the formal validity of a
contract made between persons in different
countries, in the sense just indicated, has been
very widely debated. Solutions consisting in
fixing the conclusion of the contract either in the
place where the offer was made or in the place
where the acceptance was made have been
rejected as rather artificial (47). The solution
consisting in applying to offer and acceptance
separately the law of the country in which each
was made, directly based on the Frankenstein
draft for a European code of private international
law and retained in the preliminary draft of 1972
and by the 1978 Swiss draft of Federal law on
private international law, Article 125 (2), was also
rejected. It is clear that there are numerous
requirements as to formal validity which are laid
down with regard to the contract itself, taken as a
whole and not stage by stage. This is the case
where, for example, two signatures are required
or where the contract has to be made in duplicate.
Accordingly, rather than split the law
determining the formal validity of a contract, it
seemed preferable to look for a law which would
be applicable to the formal validity of the
contract as a whole.
The choice was therefore between a liberal
solution retaining the application in the
alternative of the law of one or other of the
countries which the persons concluding the
contract were at the time it was entered into, and a
strict solution requiring the cumulative
application of these various laws. The liberal
solution was adopted by Article 9 (2). When a
contract is concluded between persons in
different countries, it is formally valid if it
satisfies the requirements as to form laid down by
the law of one of those countries or of the law
governing the substance of the contract.
4. Reservation regarding mandatory rules
Article 7 of the Convention, which contains a
reservation in favour of the application of
mandatory rules, may lead to the rejection of the
liberal system based on the application in the
alternative of either the law governing the
substance of the contract or the law of the place
where it was entered into. It may happen that
certain formal requirements laid down by the law
of the country with which a contract or act has a
close connection have a mandatory character so
marked that they could be applied even though
the law of that country is not one of those which
would normally determine formal validity under
Article 9.
In this connection mention was made of the rules
regarding form laid down by the law of the
country where an employment contract is to be
carried out, especially the requirement that a non-
competition clause should be in writing, even
though the oral form is permitted by the law of the
place where the contract was entered into or
under the law chosen by the parties.
Of course, under the system established by Article
, it will be for the court hearing the case to decide
whether it is appropriate to give effect to these
mandatory provisions and consequently to
disregard the rules laid down in Article 9.
II. Special rules peculiar to certain contracts
(paragraphs 5 and 6)
Paragraphs 5 and 6 provide special rules for the
formal validity of certain contracts made by
consumers and of contracts the subject matter of
which is a right in immovable property or a right to
use immovable property. It would have been
conceivable with regard to such contracts merely to
apply Article 7 quite simply and, as an exception to
Article 9, to allow, for example, the application of
certain formal provisions for consumer protection
laid down by the law of the consumer s habitual place
of residence, or of certain mandatory requirements as
to form imposed by the law of the country where the
immovable property is situated.
This solution, however, was not thought adequate to
ensure the effective application of these laws because
of the discretionary power which Article 7 gives to
the court hearing the case. It was accordingly decided
to exclude the first four paragraphs of Article 9
completely in the case of contracts of these kinds.
The fifth paragraph of Article  deals with the
contracts mentioned in Article 5 (I), entered into in
the circumstances described in Article 5 (2), taking
into account Article 5 (4) and (5).
Just as Article 5 protects the consumer, despite any
choice of law specified in the contract, by imposing,
as regards substance, the mandatory rules of the law
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(Article 5 (3)), Article 9 (5) imposes the rules of that
same country with regard to formal validity. This is
justified by the very close connection, in the context
of consumer protection, between mandatory rules of
form and rules of substance.
For the same reasons, it might have been expected
that the formal validity of employment contracts
would also have been made subject to mandatory
attachment to the rules of a particular national
law.
This idea, though at first contemplated, was finally
rejected. Indeed, contrary to Article 5 which provides
explicitly that consumer contracts, in the absence of
any choice by the parties, shall be subject as regards
formal validitv to the law of the countrv where the
consumer has his habitual residence, for the purpose
of determining the connecting factors applying to
employment contracts Article 6 of the Convention
only introduces rebuttable presumptions which must
be disregarded in cases where it appears from the
circumstances that the employment contract is more
closely connected with a country other than that
indicated by these presumptions. Consequently, if it
had been decided that the law governing the
substance of the contract should be mandatory for
determining the formal validity of employment
contracts, it would have been impossible, at the time
a contract was entered mto, to determine the law
governing its formal validity because of the
uncertainty caused by Article 6. Therefore no special
rule was laid down regarding the formal validity of
employment contracts, but thanks to Article 7, it is to
be expected that the mandatory rules regarding
formal validity laid down by the law of the country
where the work is to be carried out will frequently be
found to apply.
The sixth paragraph of Article 9 deals with contracts
the subject matter of which is a right in immovable
property or a right to use immovable property. Such
contracts are not subject to a mandatory connecting
factor as regards substance, Article 4 (3) merely
raising a presumption in favour of the law of the
country where the immovable property is situated. It
is clear, however, that if the law of the country where
the immovable property is situated lays down
mandatory rules determining formal validjty, these
must be applied to the contract, but only in the
probably rather rare cases where" according to that
law, these formal rules must be applied even when
the contract has been entered into abroad and 
governed by a foreign law.
The scope of this provision is the same as that of
Article 4 (3).
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Article 10
Scope of the applicable law
1. Article 10 defines the scope of the law applicable to the contract under the terms of this
Convention (48
The origina I preliminary draft contained no specific
rule on this point. It confined irselfto the provision in
Article 15 that the law which governs an obligation
also governs the conditions for its performance, the
various ways in which it can be discharged, and the
consequences of non-perfomlance. However, since
Anicle 11 cf the preliminary ::iraft defined in detail
the scope of the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations, the principal subject of Article 15 was
the scope a .
.~ 
the law of the ccntract.
2. Article 10 (1) lists the ma (tel'S which fall within
the scope of the law applicable to the contract.
However, this list is not exhaustive. as is indicated by
the words ' in particular
The law aprlicable to the contract under the terms of
his Convention governs firstly its interpretation
(subparagraph (a)).
Secondly the law applicable to the contract governs
the performance of the obligations arising from the
contract (subparagraph (b)).
This appears to embrace the totality of the
conditions, resulting from the law or from the
contract, in accordance with which the act is essential
for the fultilment of an obligation must 
performed ut not the manner of its performance (in
so far as this is referred to in the second paragraph of
Article 1 0 or the conditions rela.ting to the capacity of
the persons who are to perform it (capacity being a
matter exclr.ded from the scope of the uniform rules
subject to the provisions of Article 11) or the
conditions relating to the forni of the act which is to
be done in Jerformance of the obligation.
The following therefore fall within the provisions of
the first paragraph of Article 10: the diligence with
which the obligation must be performed: conditions
relating to the place and time of performance: the
extent to which the obligation can be performed by a
person other than the party liable; the conditions as
to performance of the obligation both in general and
in relation lO certain categories of obligation Uoint
and s~vera I obligations alternative obligations
divisible and indivisible obligations, pecuniary
obligations); where performance consists of the
payment of a sum of money, Lhe conditions relating
to the discharge of the debtor who has made the31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/33
payment, the appropriation of the payment, the
receipt, etc.
Within the limits of the powers conferred upon the
court by its procedural law, the law applicable to the
contract also governs the consequences of total 
partial failure to perform these obligations, including
the assessment of damages insofar as this is governed
by rules of law.
The assessment of damages has given rise to some
difficulties. According to some delegations the
assessment of the amount of damages is a question of
fact and should not be covered by the Convention.
To determine the amount of damages the court is
obliged to take account of economic and social
conditions in its country; there are some cases in
which the amount of damages is fixed by a jury; some
countries use methods of calculation \\ hich might not
be accepted in others. 
Other delegations countered these arguments
however, by pointing out that in several legal systems
there are rules for determining the amount of
damages; some international conventions fix limits
as to the amount of compensation (for example,
conventions relating to carriage); the amount of
damages in case of non~performance is often
prescribed in the contract and grave difficulties
would be created for the parties if these amounts had
to be determined later by the court hearing the
action.
By way of compromise the Group finally decided to
refer in subparagraph (c) solely to rules of law in
matters of assessment of damages, given that
questions of fact will always be a matter for the court
hearing the action.
The expression 'consequences of breach' refers to the
consequences which the law or the contract attaches
to the breach of a contractual obligation, whether it is
a matter of the liability of the party to whom the
breach is attributable or of a claim to terminate the
contract for breach. Any requirement of service of
notice on the party to assume his liability also comes
within this context.
According to subparagraph 1 (d), the law applicable
to the contract governs the various ways of
extinguishing obligations, and prescription and
limitation of actions. This Article must be applied
with due regard to the limited admission of
severability (depe~age) in Articles 3 and 4,
Subparagraph (e) also makes the consequences of
nullity subject to the applicable law. The working
party principal objective in introducing this
provision was to make the refunds which the parties
have to pay each other subsequent to a finding of
nullity of the contract subject to the applicable
law.
Some delegations have indicated their opposition to
this approach on the grounds that, under their legal
systems, the consequences of nullity of the contract
are non-contractual in nature. The majority of
delegations have nevertheless said they are in favour
of including such consequences within the scope of
the law of contracts, but in order  take account of
the opposition expressed provision had been made
for any Contracting State to enter a reservation on
this matter (Article 22 (1) (b)).
3, Article 10 (2) states that in relation to the manner
of performance and the steps to be taken in the event
of defe(tive performance regard shall be had to the
law of the country in which performance takes
place.
This is a restriction which is often imposed in the
national law of many countries as well as in several
international conventions. Many jurists have
supported and continue to support this restriction on
the scope of the law applicable to the contract even
when the contractual obligation is performed in a
country other than that whose law is applicable.
What is meant, however, by 'manner of performance
of an obligation? It does not seem that any precise
and uniJorm meaning is given to this concept in the
various laws and in the differing views of learned
writers. The Group did not for its part wish to give a
strict definition of this concept. It will consequently
be for the  lex (on'  to determine what is meant by
manner of performance . Among the matters
normaJJy falling within the description of ' manner of
performance , it would seem that one might in any
event mention the rules governing public holidays
the manner in which goods are to be examined, and
the steps to be taken if they are refused(49).
Article 10 (2) says that a court may have regard to the
law of the place of performance. This means that the
court may consider whether such law has any
relevance to the manner in which rhe contract should
be performed and has a discretion whether to apply it
in whole or in part so as to do justice between the
parties.
Article II
Incapacity
The legal capacity of natural persons or of bodies
corporate or unincorporate is in principle excluded
from the scope of the Convention (Article 1 (2) (a)No C 282/34 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
and (e)). This exclusion means that each Contracting
State will continue to apply its own system of private
international law to contractual capacity.
However, in the case of natural persons, the question
of capacity is not entirely excluded. Article I I is
intended to protect a party who in good faith
believed himself to be contracting with a person of
full capacity and who, after the contract has been
entered into, is confronted by the incapacity of the
other contracting party. This anxiety to protect a
party in good faith against the risk of a contract being
held voidable or void on the ground of the other
party s incapacity on account of the application of a
law other than that of the place where the contract
was concluded is clearly present in the countries
which subject capacity to the law of the
nationality (50).
A rule of the same kind is also thought necessary in
the countries which make capacity subject to the law
of the country of domicile. The only countries which
could dispense with it are those wich subject capacity
to the law of the place where the contract was entered
into or to the law governing the substance of the
contract.
Article II subjects the protection of the other party to
the contract to very stringent conditions. First, the
contract must be concluded between persons who are
in the same country. The Convention does not wish
to prejudice the protection of a party under a
disability where the contract is concluded at a
distance, between persons who are in different
countries, even if, under the law governing the
contract, the latter is deemed to have been concluded
in the country where the party with full capacity is.
Secondly, Article II is only to be applied where there
is a conflict of laws. The law which, according to the
private international law of the court hearing the
case, governs the capacity of the person claiming to
be under a disability must be different from the law
of the country where the contract was condcluded.
Thirdly, the person claiming to be under a disability
must be deemed to have full capacity by the law of
the country where the contract was concluded. This is
because it is only in this case that the other party may
rely on apparent capacity. 
In principle these three conditions are sufficient to
prevent the incapacitated person from pleading his
incapacity against the other contracting party. This
will not however be so 'if the other party to the
contract was aware of his incapacity at the time of the
conclusion of the contract or was not aware thereof
as a result of negligence . This wording implies that
the burden of proof lies on the incapacitated party. It
is he who must establish that the other party knew of
his incapacity or should have known of it.
Article 
Voluntary assignment
I. The subject of Article 12 is the voluntary
assignment of rights.
Article 12 (I) provides that the mutual obligations 
assignor and assignee under a voluntary assignment
of a right against another person (the debtor) shall be
governed by the law which under this Convention
applies to the contract between the assignor and
assIgnee.
Interpretation of this provision gives rise to 
difficulty. It is obvious that according to this
paragraph the relationship between the assignor and
assignee of a right is governed by the law applicable
to the agreement to assign.
Although the purpose and meaning of the provision
leave hardly any room for doubt, one wonders why
the Group did not draft it more simply and probably
more elegantly. For example, why not say that the
assignment of a right by agreement shall be governed
in relations between assignor and assignee by the law
applicable to that agreement.
Such a form of words had in fact been approved
initially by most of the delegations, but it was
subsquently abandoned because of the difficulties of
interpretation which might have arisen in German
law, where the expression 'assignment' of a right by
agreement includes the effects of it upon the debtor:
this was expressly excluded by Article 12 (2).
The present wording was in fact finally adopted
precisely to avoid a form which might lead to the idea
that the law applicable to the agreement for
assignment in a legal system in which it is understood
as 'Kausalgeschaft' also determines the conditions of
validity of the assignment with respect to the
debtor.
2. On the contrary, under the terms of Article 12 (2)
it is the law governing the right to which the
assignment relates which determines its assignability,
the relationship between the assignee and the debtor
the conditions under which the assignment can be
invoked against the debtor and any question whether
the debtor s obligations have been discharged.
The words 'conditions under which the assignment
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transferability of the assignment as well as the
procedures required to give effect to the assignment
in relation to the debtor.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, the
matters which it covers, with the sole exception of
assignability, are governed, as regards relations
between assignor and debtor if a contract exists
between them, by the law which governs their
contract in so far as the said matters are dealt with in
that contract.
Subrogation
I. The substitution of one creditor for another may
result both from the voluntary assignment of a right
(or assignment properly so called) referred to in
Article 12 and from the assignment of a right 
operation of law following a payment made by a
person other than the debtor.
According to the legislation in various Member
States of the Community, ' subrogration' involves the
vesting of the creditor s rights in the person who,
being obliged to pay the debt with or on behalf of
others, had an interest in satisfying it: this is so under
Article 1251-3 of the French Civil Code and Article
1203-3 of the Italian Civil Code. For example, in a
contract of guarantee the guarantor who pays instead
of the debtor succeeds to the rights of the creditor.
The same occurs when a payment is made by one of a
number of debtors who are jointly and severally
liable or when an indivisible obligation 
discharged.
Article 13 of the Convention embodies the conflict
rule in matters of subrogation of a third party to the
rights of a creditor. Having regard to the fact that the
Convention applies only to contractual obligations
the Group thought it proper to limit the application
of the rule adopted in Article 13 to assignments of
rights which are contractual in nature. Therefore this
rule does not apply to subrogation by operation of
law when the debt to be paid has its origin in tort (for
example, where the insurer succeeds to the rights of
the insured against the person causing damage).
2. According to the wording of Article 13 (I), where
a person (the creditor) has a contractual claim upon
another (the debtor), and a third person has a duty to
satisfy the creditor, or has in fact satisfied the creditor
in discharge of that duty, the law which governs the
third person s duty to satisfy the creditor shall
determine whether the third person is entitled to
exercise against the debtor the rights which the
creditor had against the debtor under the law
governing their relationship and, if so, whether he
may do so in full or only to a limited extent.
The law which governs the third person s duty to
satisfy the creditor (for example, the law applicable
to the contract of guarantee, where the guarantor has
paid instead of the debtor) will therefore determine
whether and to what extent the third person 
entitled to exercise the rights of the creditor against
the debtor according to the law governing their
contractual relations.
In formulating the rule under analysis the Group
made a point of considering situations in which a
person has paid without being obliged so to do by
contract or by law but having an economic interest
recognized by law as anticipated by Article 1251-
of the French Civil Code and Article 1203-3 of the
Italian Civil Code. In principle the same rule applies
to these situations, but the court has a discretion in
this respect.
As regards the possibility of a partial subrogation
such as that provided for by Article 1252 of the
French Civil Code and by Article 1205 of the Italian
Civil Code, it seems right that this should be subject
to the law applicable to the subrogation.
In addition, when formulating Article 13 the Group
envisaged the possibility that the legal relationship
between the third party and the debtor was governed
by a contract. This contract will obviously be
governed by the law which is applicable to it by the
terms of this Convention. Article 13 in no way affects
this aspect of the relationship between the third party
and the debtor. 
3. Article 13 (2) extends the same rule in paragraph
I to cases in which several person are liable for the
same contractual obligation (co-debtors) and the
creditor s interest has been discharged by one of
them.
4. As well as the problem of voluntary assignment
of rights and the problem of assignment of rights by
operation of law (Articles 12 and 13), there exists the
problem of assignment of duties. However, the
Group did not wish to resolve this problem, because it is new and because there are still many
uncertainties as to the solution to be given.
Article 14
Burden  of  proof,  etc.
Article 14 deals with the law to be applied to certain
questions of evidence.
There is no rule of principle dealing with evidence in
general. In the legal systems of the Contracting
States, except as regards the burden of proofNo C 282/36 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
questions of evidence (both as regards facts and acts
intended to have legal effect and as regards foreign
law) are in principle subject to the law of the forum.
This principle is, however, subject to a certain
number of exceptions which are not the same in all
these legal systems. Since it was decided that only
certain questions of evidence should be covered in
Article 14, it was thought better not to bind the
interpretation thereof by a general provision making
the rules of evidence subject to the law of the forum
on questions not decided by the Convention, such as
for example, the taking of evidence abroad or the
evidential value of legal acts. In order that there
should be no doubt as to the freedom retained by the
States regarding questions of evidence not decided
by the Convention, Article I (2) (h) excludes evidence
and procedure from the scope of the Convention
expressly without prejudice to Article 14.
Two major questions have been covered and are each
the subject of a separate paragraph. These are the
burden of proof on the one hand and the recognition
of modes of proving acts intended to have legal effect
on the other. After considerable hesitation the Group
decided not to deal with the problem of evidential
value.
A. Burden of proof
The first paragraph of Article 14 provides for the
application of the law of the contract 'to the extent
that it contains, in the law of contract, rules which
raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of
proof. Presumptions of law, relieving the party in
whose favour they operate from the necessity of
producing any evidence, are really rules of substance
which in the law of contract contribute to making
clear the obligations of the parties and therefore
cannot be separated from the law which governs the
contract. By way of example, where Article 1731 of
the French Civil Code provides that 'where no
inventory of the state of the premises has been taken
the lessee shall be deemed to have received them in
good tenantable repair and .must, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, restore them in such
condition , the Article is in reality determining the
obligation of the lessee to restore the let premises. It is
therefore logical that the law of the contract should
apply here.
The same observation applies to rules determining
the burden of proof. By way of example, Article 1147
of the French Civil Code provides that a debtor who
has failed to fulfil his obligation shall be liable for
damages 'unless he shows that this failure is due to an
extraneous cause outside his control'. This text
determines the burden of proof between the parties.
The creditor must prove that the obligation has not
been fulfilled, the debtor must prove that the failure
is due to an extraneous cause. But in dividing the
burden, the text establishes the debtor s obligations
on a vital point, since the debtor is liable for damages
even if the failure to fulfil is not due to a proven fault
on his part. The rule is accordingly a rule of
substance which can only be subject to the law of the
contract.
Nevertheless the text of the first paragraph of Article
14 does contain a restriction. The burden of proof is
not totally subject to the law of the contract. It is only
subject to it to the extent that the law of the contract
determines it with regard to contractual obligations
('in the law of contract'), that is to say only to the
extent to which the rules relating to the burden of
proof are in effect rules of substance.
This is not always the case. Some legal systems
recognize rules relating to the burden of proof
sometimes even classed as presumptions of law
which clearly are part of procedural law and which it
would be wrong to subject to the law of the contract.
This is the case, for example, with the rule whereby
the claim of a party who appears is deemed to be
substantiated if the other party fails to appear, or the
rule making silence on the part of a party to an action
with regard to facts alleged by the other party
equivalent to an admission of those facts.
Such rules do not form part of ' the law of contract'
and accordingly do not fall within the choice of law
rule established by Article 14 (1).
B. Admissibility of modes of proving acts intended
to have, legal effect
Paragraph 2 of Article 14 deals with the admissibility
of modes of proving acts intended to have legal effect
(in the sense of  voluntas negotium).
The text provides for the application in the
alternative of the law ofthe forum or of the law which
determines the formal validity of the act. This liberal
solution favouring proof of the act is already
recognized in France and in the Benelux
countries(51). It seems to be the only solution capable
of reconciling the requirements of the law of the
forum with the desire to respect the legitimate
expectations of the parties at the time of concluding
their act.
The law of the forum is normally employed to
determine the means which may be used for proving
an act intended to have legal effect, which in this
context includes a contract. If, for example, that law
allows a contract to be proved by witnesses, it should
be followed, irrespective of any more stringent
provisions on the point contained in the law31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/37
governing the substance or formal validity of the
act.
On the other hand, in the opposite case, if the law
governing the formal validity of the act only requires
oral agreement and allows such an agreement to be
proved by witnesses, the expectations of parties who
had relied on that law would be disappointed if such
proof were to be held inadmissible solely on the
ground that the law of the trial court required written
evidence of all acts intended to have legal effect The
parties must therefore be allowed to employ the
modes of proof recognized by the law governing
formal validity.
Nevertheless this liberalism should not lead to
imposing on the trial court modes of proof which its
procedural law does not enable it to administer.
Article 14 does not deal with the administration of
modes of proof, which the legal system of each
Contracting State makes subject to the law of the trial
court. Admitting the application of a law other than
that of the forum to modes of proof ought not to lead
to the rules of the law of the forum, as regards the
. administration of the modes of proof, being rendered
nugatory.
This is the explanation of the proviso which in
substance enables a court, without reference to
public policy, to disregard modes of proof which the
law of procedure cannot generally allow, such as an
affidavit, the testimony of a party or common
knowledge. Consideration was also given to the case
of rights subject to registration in a public register
holding that the authority charged with keeping that
register could, owing to that provision, only
recognize the modes of proof provided for by its own
law.
Such being the general system adopted, a proviso had
to be added regarding the law determining formal
validity applicable as an alternative to the law of the
forum.
The text refers to 'any of the laws referred to in
Article 9 under which that contract or act is formally
valid' . This expression means that if, for example, the
act is formally valid under the law governing the
substance of the contract but is not formally valid
under the law of the place where it was done, the
parties may employ only the modes of proof
provided for by the first of these two laws, even if the
latter is more liberal as regards proof. The reference
in Article 14 (2) to the law governing formal validity
is clearly based on the assumption that the law
governing formal validity has been observed. On the
other hand, if the act is formally valid according to
both laws  (lex causae  and  lex loci actus)  mentioned in
Article 9, the parties will be able to employ the modes
of proof provided for by either of those laws.
C. There is no provision dealing with the evidential
value of acts intended to have legal effeCt. The
preliminary draft of 1972 contained a provision
covering two questions derived, in Roman law
countries, from the concept of evidential value; the
question how far  written document affords
sufficient evidence of the obligations contained in it
and the question of the modes of proof to add to or
contradict the contents of the document 
- '
outside
and against the content' of such  document,
according to the old phraseology of the Code
Napoleon (Article 1341). Despite long discussion, no
agreement could be reached between the delegations
and it was therefore decided to leave the question of
evidential value outside the scope of the
Convention.
Article 
Exclusion  of  renvoi
This Article excludes renvoi.
It is clear that there is no place for renvoi in the law of
contract if the parties have chosen the law to be
applied to their contract. If they have made such a
choice, it is clearly with the intention that the
provisions of substance in the chosen law shall be
applicable; their choice accordingly excludes any
possibility of renvoi to another law (52).
Renvoi is also excluded where the parties have not
chosen the law to be applied. In this case the contract
is governed, in accordance with Article 4 (1), by the
law of the country with which it is most closely
connected. Paragraph 2 introduces a presumption
that that country is the country where the party who
is to effect the performance which is characteristic of
the contract has his habitual residence. It would not
be reasonable for a court, despite this express
localization, to subject the contract to the law of
another country by introducing renvoi solely
because the rule of conflict of laws in the country
where the contract was localized contained other
connecting factors. This is equally so where the last
paragraph of Article 4 applies and the court has
decided the place of the contract with the aid of
indications which seem to it decisive.
More generally, the exclusion of renvoi is justified in
international conventions regarding conflict of laws.
If the Convention attempts as far as possible to
localize the legal situation and to determine the
country with which it is most closely connected, the
law specified by the conflicts rule in the Convention
should not be allowed to question this determination
of place. Such, moreover, has been the solution
adopted since 1951 in the conventions concluded at
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Article 
Onlre public
Article 16 contains a precise and restrictively worded
reservation in favour of public policy ('ordre
public
First it is expressly stated that, in the abstract and
taken as a whole, public policy is not to affect the law
specified by the Convention. Public policy is only to
be taken into account where a certain provision of
the specified law, if applied in an actual case, would
lead to consequences contrary to the public policy
Cordre public ) of the forum. It may therefore happen
that a foreign law, which might in the abstract be held
to be contrary to the public policy of the forum
could nevertheless be applied, if the actual result of
its being applied does not in itself offend the public
policy of the forum.
Secondly, the result must be 'manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the forum.
This condition, which is to be found in all the Hague
Conventions since 1956, requires the court to find
special grounds for upholding an objection (53).
Article 16 provides that it is the public policy of the
forum which must be offended by the application of
the specified law. It goes without saying that this
expression includes Community public policy, which
has become an integral part of the public policy
('ordre public ) of the Member States of the
European Community.
Article 
No retrospective effect
Article 17 means that the Convention has no
retrospective effect on contracts already in existence.
It applies only to contracts concluded after it enters
into force, but the entry into force must 
considered separately for each State since the
Convention will not enter into force simultaneously
in all the contracting States (see Article 29). Of
course, there is no provision preventing a court of a
contracting State with respect to which the
Convention has not yet entered into force from
applying it in advance unter the concept of  ratio
scripta.
Article 
U nif onn interpretation
This Article is based on a formula developed by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.
The draft revision of the uniform law on
international sales and the preliminary draft of the
Convention on prescription and limitation of actions
in international sales contained the following
provision: 'In the interpretation and application of
this Convention regard shall be had to its
international character and to the necessity of
promoting uniformity This provision, whose
wording was slightly amended has been
incorporated in the United Nations Convention on
contracts for the international sale of goods
(Article 7) signed in Vienna on 11 April 1980.
Article 18 operates as a reminder that in interpreting
an international convention regard must be had to its
international character and that, consequently, a
court will not be free to assimilate the provisions of
the Convention in so far as concerns their
interpretation, to provisions of law which are purely
domestic. It seemed that one of the advantages of this
Article might be to enable parties to rely in their
actions on decisions given in other countries.
It is within the spirit of this Article that a solution
must be found to the problem of classification, for
which, following the example of the Benelux uniform
law, the French draft and numerous conventions of
The Hague, the Convention has refrained from
formulating a special rule.
Article 18 will retain its importance even if a protocol
subjecting the interpretation of the Convention to the
Court of Justice of the European Communities is
drawn up pursuant to the Joint Declaration of the
Representatives of the Governments made when the
Convention was opened for signature on 19 June
1980.
Article 
States with more than one legal system
This Article is based on similar provisions contained
in some of the Hague Conventions (see, for example,
the Convention on the law applicable to matrimonial
property regimes, Articles 17 and 18 and the
Convention on the law applicable to agency, Articles
19 and 20).
According to the first paragraph, where a State has
several territorial units each with its own rules of law
in respect of contractual obligations, each of those
units will be considered as a country for the purposes
of the Convention. If, for example, in the case of
Article 4, the party who is to effect the performance
which is characteristic of the contract has his habitual
residence in Scotland, it is with Scottish law that the
contract will be deemed to be most closely
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Paragraph 2, which is of special concern to the
United Kingdom, covers the case where the situation
is connected with several territorial units in a single
country but not with another State. In such a case
there is a conflict of laws, but it is a purely domestic
matter for the State concerned which consequently is
under no obligation to resolve it by applying the rules
of the Convention.
Article 20
Precedence of Community law
This Article is intended to avoid the possibility of
conflict between this Convention and acts of the
Community institutions, by according precedence to
the latter. The text is based on that of Article 52 (2) of
the Convention of 27 September 1968 as revised by
the Accession Convention of 9 October 1978.
The Community provisions which will have
precedence over the Convention are, as regards their
object, those which, in relation to particular matters
lay down rules of private international law with
regard to contractual obligations. For example, the
Regulation on conflict of laws with respect to
employment contracts will, when it has been finally
adopted, take precedence over the Convention.
The Governments of the Member States have,
nevertheless, in a joint declaration, expressed the
wish that these Community instruments will be
consistent with the provisions of the Convention.
As regards the form which these instruments are to
take, the Community provisions contemplated by
Article 20 are not only acts of the institutions of the
European Communities, that is to say principally the
Regulations and the Directives as well as the
Conventions concluded by those Communities, but
also national laws harmonized in implementation of
such acts. A law or regulation adopted by a State in
order to make its legislation comply with a Directive
borrows, as it were, from the Directive its
Community force, thus justifying the precedence
accorded to it over this Convention.
Finally, the precedence which Article 20 accords to
Community law applies not only to Community law
in force at the date when this Convention enters into
force, but also to that adopted after the Convention
has entered into force.
Article 
Relationship with other Conventions
This Article, which has its equivalent in the Hague
Conventions on the law applicable to matrimonial
property regimes (Article 20) and on the law
applicable to agency (Article 22) means that this
Convention will not prejudice the application of any
other international agreement, present or future, to
which a Contracting State is or becomes party, for
example, to Conventions relating to carriage. This
leaves open the possibility of a more far-reaching
international unificatin with regard to all or part of
the ground covered by this Convention.
This provision does not of course eliminate all
possibility of difficulty arising from the combined
application of this Convention and another
concurrent Convention especially if the latter
contains a provision similar to that in Article 21. But
the States which are parties to several Conventions
must seek a solution to these difficulties of
application without jeopardizing the observance of
their international obligations.
Moreover, Article 21 must be read in conjunction
with Articles 24 and 25. The former specifies the
conditions under which a contracting State may
become a party to a multilateral Convention after the
date on which this Convention enters into force with
respect thereto. The latter deals with the case where
the conclusion of other Conventions would prejudice
the unification achieved by this Convention.
Article 
Reservations
This Article indicates the reservations which may be
made to the Convention, the reasons for which have
been set out in this report as regards Articles 7 (1) and
10 (1) (e). Following the practice generally applied, in
particular in the Hague Conventions, it lays down the
procedure by means of which these reservations can
be made or withdrawn.No C 282/40 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
FINAL PROVISIONS
TITLE III
Article 
U Bilateral adoption by a CO8tractiDg State of a new
choice of law rule
Article 23 is an unusual text since it allows the
contracting States to make unilateral derogations
from the rules of the Convention. This weakening of
its mandatory force was thought desirable because of
the very wide scope of the Convention and the very
general character of most of its rules. The case was
envisaged where a State found it necessary for
political economic or social reasons to amend a
choice of law rule and it was thought desirable to find
a solution sufficiently flexible to enable States to
ratify the Convention without having to denounce it
as soon as they were forced to disregard its rules on a
particular point.
The possibility of making unilateral derogations
from the Convention is, however, subject to certain
conditions and restrictions.
First, derogation is only possible if it consists in
adopting a new choice of law rule in regard to a
particular category of contract. For example, Article
23 would not authorize a State to abandon the
general principle of the Convention. But it would
enable it to adopt, under the conditions specified, a
particular choice oflaw rule different from that of the
Convention with respect, for example, to contracts
made by travel agencies or to contracts for
correspondence courses where the specialist nature
of the contract could justify this derogation from the
common rule. It is of course understood that the
derogation procedure shall only be imposed on
States if the contract for which they wish to adopt a
new choice of law rule falls within the scope of the
Convention.
Secondly, such a derogation is subject to procedural
conditions. The State which wishes to derogate from
the Convention must inform the other signatory
States through the Secretary-General of the Council
of the European Communities. The latter shall, if a
State so requests, arrange for consultation between
the signatory States in order to reach unanimous
agreement. If, within a period of two years, no State
has requested consultation or no agreement has been
able to be reached, the State may then amend its law
in the manner indicated.
The Group considered whether this procedure
should apply to situations where the contracting
States would wish to adopt a rule of the kind referred
. to in Article 7 of the Convention, i. e. a mandatory
rule which must be applied whatever the law
applicable to the contract. It was considered that the
States should not be bound to submit themselves to
the Article 23 procedure before adopting such a rule.
But to escape the application of Article 23 the rule in
question must meet the criteria of Article 7 and be
explicable by the strong mandatory character of the
rule of substantive law which it lays down. It is not
the intention that the contracting States should 
able to avoid the conditions of Article 23 by
disguising under the form of a mandatory rule of the
Article 7 kind a rule of conflict dealing with matters
whose absolute mandatory nature is not
established.
Articles  24  and 
New Conventions
The procedure for consultation imposed under
Article 23 on a State intending to derogate from the
Convention by amending its national law is also
imposed on a State which wishes to derogate from the
Convention on becoming a party to another
Convention.
This system of 'freedom under supervision' imposed
on contracting States applies only to conventions
whose main object or whose principal aim or one of
whose principal aims is to lay down rules of private
international law concerning any of the matters
governed by this Convention. Consequently the
States are free to accede to a Convention which
consolidates the material law of such and such a
contract, with regard, for example, to transport and
which contains, as an ancillary provision, a rule of
private international law. But, within the area thus
defined, the consultation procedure applies even to31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/41
Conventions which were open for signature before
the entry into force of the present Convention.
Article 24 (2) further restricts the scope of the
obligation imposed on the States by specifying that
the procedure in the first paragraph need not
apply:
1. if the object of the new Convention is to revise a
former Convention. The opposite solution would
have had the unfortunate effect of obstructing the
modernization of existing Conventions;
2. if one or more contracting States or the European
Communities are already parties to the new
Convention;
3. if the new Convention is concluded within the
framework of the European Treaties particularly
in the case of a multilateral Convention to which
one of the Communities is already party. These
rules are in harmony with the precedence of
Community law provided for under Article 20.
Article 24 therefore establishes a clear distinction
between Conventions to which contracting States
may freely become parties and those to which they
may become parties only upon condition that they
submit to consultation procedure.
For Conventions of the former class, Article 25
provides for the case where the conclusion of such
agreements prejudiced the unification achieved by
this Convention. If a contracting State considers that
such is the case, it may request the Secretary-General
of the Council of the European Communities to open
consultation procedure. The text of the Article
implies that the Secretary-General of the Council
possesses a certain discretionary power. The Joint
Declaration annexed to this Convention in fact
provides that, even before the entry into force of this
Convention, the States will confer together if one of
them wishes to become  party to such a
C9nvention.
For Conventions of the latter class, the consultation
procedure is the same as that of Article 23 except that
the period of two years is here reduced to one
year.
Article 
Revision
This Article provides for a possible revision of the
Convention, It is identical with Article 67 of the
Convention of 27 September 1968.
Articles  27  to 
Usual protocol clauses
Article 27 defines the territories of the Member States
to which the Convention is to apply (cf. Article 60 of
the revised Convention of 27 September 1968).
Articles 28 and 29 deal with the opening for signature
of the Convention and its ratification. Article 28 does
not make any statement on the methods by which
each contracting State will incorporate the provisions
of the Convention into its national law. This is a
matter which by international custom is left to the
sovereign discretion of States. Each contracting State
may therefore give effect to the Convention either by
giving it force of law directly or by including its
provisions into its own national legislation in a form
appropriate to that legislation. The most noteworthy
provision is that of Article 29 (1) which provides for
entry into force after seven ratifications. It appeared
that to require ratification by all nine contracting
States might result in delaying entry into force for too
long a period.
Article 30 lays down a duration of 10 years,
automatically renewable for five-year periods. For
States which ratify the Convention after its entry into
force, the period of 10 years or five years to be taken
into consideration is that which is running for the
first States in respect of which the Convention
entered into force (Article 29 (I)). Article 30 (3)
makes provision for denunciation in manner similar
to the Hague Conventions (see for example Article 28
Agency Convention). Such a denunciation will take
effect on expiry of the period of 10 years or five years
as the case may be (cf. Article 30 (3)). This Article has
no equivalent in the Convention of 27 September
1968. The difference is explained by the fact that this
Convention, unlike that of 1968, is not directly based
on Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. It is a
Convention freely concluded between the States of
the Community and not imposed by the Treaty.
Articles 31 and 33 entrust the management of the
Convention (deposit of the Convention and
notification to the signatory States) to the Secretary-
General of the Council of the European
Communities.
No provision is made for third States to accede to the
Convention. The question was discussed by the
Group but it was unable to reach agreement. In these
circumstances, if a third State asked to accede to the
Convention, there would have to be consultation
among the Member States.
On the other hand a solution was found to the
position vis-a- vis  the Convention, of States which
might subsequently become members of the
European Community.No C 282/42 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10.
The Group considered that the Convention itself
could not deal with this question as it is a matter
which falls within the scope of the Accession
Convention with new members. Accordingly it
simply drew up a joint declaration by the contracting
States expressing the view that new Member States
should be under an obligation also to accede to this
Convention.
Protocol relating to the Danish Statute on Maritime
Law  Article 169
The Danish Statute on Maritime Law is a uniform
law common to the Scandinavian countries. Due to
the method applied in Scandinavian legal
cooperation it is not based upon a Convention but a
result of the simultaneous introduction in the
Parliaments of identical bills.
Article 169 of the Statute embodies a number of
choice of law rules. These rules are partly based upon
the bills of lading Convention 1924 as amended by
the 1968 Protocol (The Hague  Visby rules). To the
extent that that is the case, they are upheld as a result
of Article 21 of the present Convention, even after its
ratification by Denmark.
The rule in Article 169, however, provides certain
additional choice of law rules with respect to the
applicable law in matters of contracts of carriage by
sea. These could have been retained by Denmark
under Article 21 if the Scandinavian countries had
cooperated by means of Conventions. It has been
accepted that the fact that another method of
cooperation has been followed should not prevent
Denmark from retaining this result of Scandinavian
cooperation in the field of uniform legislation. The
rule in the Protocol permitting revision of Article 169
without following the procedure prescribed in Article
23 corresponds to the rule in Article 24 (2) of the
Convention with respect to revision of other
Conventions to which the States party to this
Convention are also party.31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/43
NOTES
relating to the report OD the ConventioD on the law applicable to contractual
obligations
(I) Minutes of the meeting of 26 to 28 February 1969.
(2) Minutes of the meeting of 26 to 28 February 1969, pages 3, 4 and 9.
(3) Commission document 12.665/XIV /68.
(4) Minutes of the meeting of 26 to 28 February 1969.
(5) Minutes of the meeting of 20 to 22 October 1969.
(6) Minutes of the meeting of 2 and 3 February 1970.
(1) See the following Commission documents: 12.153.XIV.70 (questionnaire
prepared by Professor Giuliano and replies of the rapporteurs); 6.975/XIV /70
(questionnaire prepared by Mr Van Sasse van Ysselt and replies of the
rapporteurs); 15.393/XIV /70 (questionnaire prepared by Professor Lagarde and
replies of the rapporteurs).
(8) The meetings were held on the following dates: 28 September to 2 October 1970;
16 to 20 November 1970; 15 to 19 February 1971; 15 to 19 March 1971; 28 June to
2 July 1971; 4 to 8 October 1971; 29 November to 3 December 1971; 31 January
to 3 February 1972; 20 to 24 March 1972; 29 to 31 May 1972; 21 to 23 June
1972.
(9) Minutes of the meeting of 21 to 23 June 1972, page 29  et seq.
(10) The meetings were held on the following dates: 22 to 23 September 1975; 17 to
19 December 1975; 1 to 5 March 1976; 23 to 30 June 1976; 16 to 17 December
1976; 21 to 23 February 1977; 3 to 6 May 1977; 27 to 28 June 1977; 19 to
23 September 1977; 12 to 15 December 1977; 6 to 10 March 1978; 5 to 9 June
1978; 25 to 28 September 1978; 6 to 10 November 1978; 15 to 16 January 1979;
19 to 23 February 1979.
(11) The list of government experts who took part in the work of this  ad hoc  working
party or in the work of the working party chaired by Mr Jenard is attached to this
report.
(12) The work done on company law by the European Communities falls into three
categories. The first category consists of the Directives provided for by Article 54
(3) (g) of the EEC Treaty. Four of these Directives are already in force. The first,
issued on 9 March 1968 (OJ No L 65, 14. 3. 1968), concerns disclosure, the extent
to which the company is bound by acts done on its behalf, and nullity, in relation
to public limited companies. The second, issued on 13 December 1976 (OJ No
L 26, 31. I. 1977), concerns the formation of public limited companies and the
maintenance and alteration of their capital. The third, issued on 9 October 1978
(OJ No L 295, 20. 10. 1978), deals with company mergers, and the fourth, issued
on 25 July 1978 (OJ No L 222, 14. 8. 1978), relates to annual accounts. Four other
proposals for Directives made by the Commission are currently before the
Council. They concern the structure of 'societes anonymes' (OJ No C 131 , 13. 12.
1972), the admission of securities to quotation (OJ No C 131 , 13. 12. 1972),
consolidated accounts (OJ No C 121 6. 1976) and the minimum qualifications
of persons who carry out legal audits of company accounts (OJ No C 112, 13.
1978). The second category comprises the Conventions provided for by Article
220 of the EEC Treaty. One of these concerns the mutual recognition of
companies and legal persons. It was signed at Brussels on 29 February 1968 (the
text was published in Supplement No 2 of 1969 to the Bulletin of the European
Communities). The draft of a second Convention will shortly be submitted to theNo C 282/44 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
Council; it concerns international mergers. Finally, work has progressed with a
view to creating a Statute for European companies. This culminated in the
proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for European companies, dated 30 June
1970 (OJ No C 124, 10. 10. 1970).
(13) For the text of the judgment, see:  Rev. crit,  1911 , p. 395; Journal  dr. into prive
1912
, p. 
1156. For comments, cf. Batiffol and Lagarde,  Droit international prive
(2 voL), sixth edition, Paris, 1974-1976, II, No 567-573, pp. 229-241.
(14) Kegel Internationales Privatrecbt: Ein Studienbuch third edition, Miinchen-
Berlin, 1971, ~ 18, pp. 253-257; Kegel Das IPR im Einfiihrungsgesetz zum BGB
in Soergel/Siebert,  Kommentar zum BGB  (Band 7), 10th edition, 1970, Margin
Notes 220-225; Reithmann Intt:mationales Vertragsrecht. Das internationale
Privatrecbt der Schuldvertrige third edition, Koln, 1980, margin notes 5 and 6
Drobnig,  American-German Private International Law second edition, New
York, 1972, pp. 225-232.
(15) Morelli Elementi di diritto internazionale privato italiano,  10th edition, Napoli
1971 , Nos 97-98, pp. 154-157; Vitta, Op. cit., III. pp. 229-290.
(16)  Rev. crit. 1938, p. 661.
(17) Frederic La vente en droit international prive in  Recueil des Cours de rAc. de
La Haye Tome 93 (1958-1), pp. 30-48; Rigaux Droit international prive
Bruxelles, 1968, Nos 348-349; Vander Elst,  Droit international prive. Regles
generales des conflits de lois dans les differentes matieres de droit prive
Bruxelles, 1977, No 56, p. 100  et seq.
(18) The text of the judgement in the  Alnati  case (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1967
p. 3) is published in the French in  Rev. crit. 1967, p. 522. (Struycken note on the
Alnati decision). For the views of legal writers: cf. : J. J. Th. Deelen
Rechtskeuze in het Nederlands internationaal contractenrecht, Amsterdam
1965; W. L.G. Lemaire, Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht, 1968, p. 242 
ss.
.. 
Jessurun d'Oliveira, Kotting, Bervoets en De Boer, Partij-invloed in het
Internationaal Privaatrecht, Amsterdam 1974.
(19) The principle of freedom of choice has been recognized in England since at least
1796:  Gienar V. Mieyer  (1796), 2 Hy. Bl. 603.
(20) (1939) A.C. 277, p. 290.
(20a) See, e. , the Employment Protection (Consolidation Act 1978, s. 153 (5) and the
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, S. 30 (6)).
(20b) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, S. 27 (2).
(2OC) Anton Private International Law pp. 187-192.
(2Od) This includes cases where the parties have attempted to make an express choice
but have not done so with sufficient Clarity.
(20e)  Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA V. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation
SA  (1971) A.C. 572, at pp. 584, 587 to 591, 596 to 600, 604 to 607.
(21) Lando,  Contracts in  International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law vol. III
Private International Law  (Lipstein, Chief editor), sections-51 and 54, pp. 28 to
29; Philip,  Dans! International Privat-og Procesret second edition
Copenhagen, 1972, p. 291.
(22) C. Publications Serie A, Nos 20 to 21 , p. 122.
(23)  International Law Reports vol. 27
, pp. 
117 to 233, p. 165;  Riv. dir. int. 1963,
pp. 230 to 249, p. 244.
(24) For a summary of this award, including extensiye quotations, see: Lalive, 
recent arbitrage suisse entre un organisme d'Etat et une societe privee etrangere
in  Annuaire suisse de dr. int. 1963, pp. 273 to 302, especially pp. 284 to 288.
(25)  Int. Legal Mat. 1979, pp. 3 to 37 , at p. 11;  Riv. dir. int. 1978, pp. 514to 517, at
518.31. 10. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/45
(26) The first Convention, dated 1 October 1976, was in force between the following
eight European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland. The Republic of Niger also acceded to the convention. For
the text of the second and third conventions, see:  Associazione Italiana per
l'Arbitrato , Conventions multilaterales et autres instruments en matiere
arbitrage,  Roma, 1974, pp. 86 to 114. For the text of the fourth convention see:
Coni de La Haye de droit international priv6, Recueil des conventions (/951-
J77),  p. 252. For the state of ratifications and accessions to these Conventions at
1 February 1976, see: Giuliano, Pocar and Treves Codice delle convenzioni di 
diritto internazionale privato e processuale Milano, 1977, pp. 1404, 1466  et seq.
1497  et seq.
(21) Kegel Das IPR cit. margin notes 269 to 273 and notes 1 and 3; Batiffol and
Lagarde,  Droit international priv6  cit. II, No 592, p. 243 ~ judgment of the French
Cour de Cassation of 18 November 1959 in  Soc. Deckardt  c.  Etabl Moatti
Rev. crit. 1960, p. 83.
(28) Cf. Trib. Rotterdam, 2 April 1963, S ~ S 1963, 53; Kollewijn, De rechtskeuse
achteraf Neth. Int. Law Rev.  1964 225; Lemaire Nederlands Internationaal
Privaatrecht, 1968, 265.
(29)  Riv. dir. into priv. proc. 1967
, pp. 
126  et seq.
(30) V. Treves T. Sulla volonta delle paTti di cui aiI'm.  25  delle preleggi e sui
momento del suo sorgere,  in  Riv. dir. into priv. proc. 1967, pp. 315  et seq.
(31) For a comparative survey cf. Rabel The Conflict of Laws. A comparative study,
, second edition, Ann Arbor, 1960, Chapter 30, pp. 432 to 486.
(32) Batiffol and Lagarde.  Droit international prive,  cit., II , Nos 572  et scq. pp. 236 
seq. and the essay of Batiffol Subjectivisme et objectivisme dans Ie droit
international prive des contrats,  reproduit dans choix d'articles rassembles par
ses amis, Paris 1976, pp. 249 to 263.
(33)  Rev. crit. 1955, p. 330.
(34) According to German case law
, '
hypothetischer-Parteiwille' does not involve
seeking the supposed intentions of the parties, but evaluating the interests
involved reasonably and equitably, on an objective basis, with a view to
determing the law applicable (BGH, 14 April 1953, in IPRspr., 1952-53, No 40,
pp. 151  et seq.
). 
According to another case, ' in making this evaluation of the
interests involved, the essential question is where the centre of gravity of the
contractual relationship is situated' (BGH, 14 July 1955, in IPRspr., 1954--1955,
No 67 , pp. 206  et seq.
). 
The following may be consulted on this concept: Kegel
Internationales Privatrecht ct. ~ 18, pp. 257  et seq. Kegel Das IPR  cit., Nos 240
to 268, and the numerous references to judicial decisions given in the notes;
Reithmann Internationales Vertragsrecht cit. , pp. 42  et seq.
(35) See  Bonython  V.  Commonwealth of Australia  (1951) A.C. 201 at p. 219;
Tomkinson  v.  First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co.  (1961) A.C. 1007 at
pp. 1068 , 1081 and 1082;  James Miller and Partners Ltd.  V.  Whitworth Street
Estates (Manchester) Ltd  (1970) A.C. 583 at pp. 603, 605 and 606, 601 to 611;
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA  V.  Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation
SA  (1971) A.C. 572 at pp. 583, 587, 603;  Coast Lines Ltd  V.  Hudig and Veder
Chartering NY,  (1972) 2 Q.B. 34 at pp. 44, 46, 50.
(36)  Mount Albert Borough Councilv. Australian Temperance and General Mutual
Life Assurance Society  (1938) A.C. 224 at p. 240  per  Lord Wright;  The Assunzione
(1974) P. 150 at pp. 175 and 179  per  Singleton LJ.
(36a) Anton Private International Law pp. 192 to 197.
(31) See to this effect: Cour de Cassation, judgment of 28 March 1953 (n. 827),  supra;
Cour de Cassation (full court), judgment of 28 June 1966 (n. 1680),  supra;  Cour
de Cassation, judgment of 30 April 1969 (n. 1403), in  Offlcina Musso  C.  Societe
Sevplant (Riv. dir. into priv, proc. 1970, pp. 332  et seq.  For comments: MorelliNo C 282/46 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
Elementi di diritto internazionale privato cit. n. 97, p. 155; Vitta.  Dir. intern.
privato  (3 V) Torino 1972-1975 III, pp. 229 to 290.
(38) See especially Vischer Internationales Vertragsrecht Bern, 1962, especially pp.
89 to 144. This work also contains a table of the decisions in which this connection
has been upheld. See also the judgment of I April 1970 of the Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam, in  NAP NVv. Christophery.
(39) This is the solution adopted by the Court of Limoges in its judgment of
10 November 1970, and by the Tribunal de commerce of Paris in its judgment of
4 December 1970  (Rev. crit. 1971 , pp. 703  et seq.
). 
The same principle underlies
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 6 April 1973 (N.I. 1973
N. 371). See also Article 6 of the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the law
applicable to agency.
(40) For the judgments mentioned in the text see:  Rev. crit.  1967 pp. 521 to 523; (1920)
2 K.B. 287; (1958) A.C. 301; (1963) 2 Q.B. 352 and more recently: R. Van Rooij, 
positie van publiekrechtelijke regels op bet tenein van bet internationaal
privaatrecht 1976, 236  et seq. L. Strikwerda Semipubliekrecht in bet
confJictenrecht,  1978, 76  et seq.
(4Oa) On this Article, see the reflections of Vi scher The antagonism between legal
security and search of justice in the field of contract,  in Recueil de l' Academie de
La Haye, Tome 142 (1974 II) pp. 21 to 30; Lando  op. cit.  n. ~OO to 203 pp. 106 to
110; Segre (T),  II diritto comunitario della conconenza come legge
applicazione necessaria in  Riv. dir. into priv. et proc.  1979 pp. 75 to 79;
Drobnig, comments on Article 7 of the draft convention in  European Private
International Law of obligations  edited by Lando  Yon Hoffman-Siehr
Tiibingen 1975 , pp. 88  et seq.
(41 ) V. Delaporte,  Recherches sur la forme des actesjuridiques en droit international
prive.  Thesis Paris I, 1974, duplicated, No 123  et seq.
(42) V. Delaporte,  op. cit. No III.
(43) The possibility of applying a common national law is expressly provided for by
Article 26 of the preliminary provisions to the Italian Civil Code. See also Article
2315 of the French draft of 1967.
(44) The solution adopted has been influenced by that approved, though in a wider
setting, by the Corte di Cassazione italiana, 30 Apri11969,  Riv. dir. into priv. e pro.
1970, 332  et seq.  It is contrary to that given by the Cour de Cassation of France
10 December 1974, Rev. crit. dr. inter. pro 1975, 474, note A.P. The alternative
solution also prevails in the United Kingdom Van Grutten V. Digby  (1862), 31
Beav. 561; cf. Cheshire and North P.IL.  10th edition, p. 220.
(45) Solution adopted in German (principal law), Article 11 E. ; in Italy
(subsidiary) Article 26 prel. pro. and in France (Cour de Cassation 26 May 1963,
Rev. cnt. dr. into pro  1964, 513, note Loussouarn; 10 December 1974 see note 44
above), and implicitly allowed by the Benelux Treaty (Article 19).
(46) Se references cited in the previous note.
(47) See, for example, Article 13 (4) of the Benelux Treaty 1969 which has not entered
into force.
(48) For a comparative outline on this subject, see: Toubiana:  Le domaine de la loi du
contrat en droit international prive  (contrats internationaux et dirigisme
economique) Paris 1972, spec. pp. 1 to 146; Lando:  Contracts in International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,  vol. III Private international law  (Lipstein
chief editor) sections 199 to 231 pp. 106 to 125.
(49) See on this subject Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1955 on the law
applicable to international sales of corporeal movables.
(50) See the Benelux Treaty 1969 (Article 2) not entered into force, the preliminary
provisions of the Italian Civil Code (Article 1), the law introducing the German31. 10. 80 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 282/47
Civil Code (Article 7) and French judicial decisions. Rec. 16 January 1861
Lizardi, D.P. 1861.1.193, S. 1861.1.305.
(51) See Article 20 (3) of the Benelux Treaty 1969 not entered into force and, in
France, Casso 24 February 1959 (Isaac), D. 1959 J. 485; 12 February 1963  (Ruf1ini
v. Sylvestre), Rev. crit. d.i.p. 1964, p. 121.
(52) Cf. Kegel IPR fourth edition, p. 173; Batiffol and Lagarde, sixth edition, p. 394;
Article 2 of the Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international
sales of corporeal movables; Article 5 of the Con vention of 14 March 1978 on the
law applicable to agency. Dicey and Morris, ninth edition pp. 723 to 724.
(53) See  Acts and Documents of the Hague Conference,  IXth Session vol. III WHls
(1961) explanatory report, p. 170.No C 282/48 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 10. 80
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